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* feat: rebuild plugin pages with host rendering and native settings * fix(plugins): contain host-view errors, isolate editing, and migrate fixtures * fix(plugins): migrate remaining permission fixture hosts
65 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
3.5 KiB
Markdown
# Embedded plugin UI feasibility
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> Research only. The user subsequently clarified that plugin UI must be drawn
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> by Netcatty, not displayed in an embedded frame. See
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> [host-rendered React UI research](./native-react-ui-research.md).
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## Goal
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Allow ordinary React, HTML and CSS inside the application's normal stacking
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order while keeping the existing plugin permissions and offline-by-default
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execution boundary. The plugin must not gain access to the host document,
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privileged preload, other plugins, files, the network, or navigation simply
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because it can render a view.
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## Evidence from the current runtime
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`electron/plugins/embeddedFrameSecurity.live.test.cjs` is an isolated Electron
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proof, not a product implementation. Run it with:
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```
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./node_modules/.bin/electron electron/plugins/embeddedFrameSecurity.live.test.cjs
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```
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On Electron 42.11.12 (Chromium 148.0.7778.280), a frame with `sandbox=allow-scripts`,
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a restrictive CSP and no Node integration could not read its parent or local
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storage. A host overlay appeared above it. Fetch and image requests were blocked,
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and `will-frame-navigate` stopped an attempted navigation. The same frame could
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still send UDP packets to a local STUN endpoint with `RTCPeerConnection`: in
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one run three packets arrived. This proves that the prototype's CSP and frame
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sandbox do not reproduce the existing offline-session boundary.
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`Connection-Allowlist: (); webrtc=block` did not prevent those packets on this
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Chromium build, even when the experimental `ConnectionAllowlists` switch was
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supplied. Chrome's official announcement says the header is introduced in Chrome
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152; it must not be assumed to protect the current Electron version. A future
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upgrade still requires adversarial verification for every supported platform.
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- https://developer.chrome.com/blog/connection-allowlist-announcement
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- https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/web-embeds
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- https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Reference/Elements/iframe
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## Required work before adoption
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1. Enforce and independently test per-plugin network isolation, including
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WebRTC, WebTransport, navigation, redirects, downloads, workers, DNS and
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browser APIs. A JavaScript shim or CSP alone is not a security boundary.
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2. Register packaged assets in the actual owner session without exposing host
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assets or another plugin's package. Test opaque-origin module loading, CSS,
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local images and fonts, and reject navigation away from the registered view.
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3. Ensure no child frame receives privileged preloads or can call trusted IPC;
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validate both the actual sender frame and ownership on every operation.
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4. Use a dedicated bounded message channel tied to a live instance and owner;
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reject cross-window, stale, replayed and unauthorized requests, and close on
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lock, disable, unload, crash, navigation and window shutdown.
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5. Preserve view state, themes, accessibility, focus, shortcuts and layout
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across Vault, terminal sidebar, tab, modal, panel, aside and settings.
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6. Add a real React example and verify host menus and dialogs overlap it without
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hiding the page. Run isolation tests and interaction tests on all supported OSes.
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Do not enable this as a general plugin surface until these conditions pass.
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The current `WebContentsView` path remains active meanwhile. Alternative designs
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include a host-rendered protocol with isolated React logic; that can retain the
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existing offline runtime, but needs a substantial compatibility layer for
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ordinary React DOM libraries and truly free-form CSS.
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