mirror of
https://github.com/binaricat/Netcatty.git
synced 2026-11-20 15:19:16 +00:00
* feat(terminal): add disconnect/reconnect controls on session status bar Workspace panes could not reach tab-level reconnect. Expose disconnect (without closing the pane) and reconnect beside the host info actions so split sessions stay operable. Closes #2769. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): abort in-flight boot on status-bar disconnect Disconnect keeps the pane mounted, so cancel's unmount cleanup never runs. Flip isBootActiveRef (and isCancelling) so a late startSSH/startMosh attach cannot resurrect the session after the user disconnects mid-connect. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): ignore stale start UI after status-bar disconnect When disconnect aborts an in-flight connect, starter catch paths must not reopen auth or repopulate errors. Gate SSH/telnet/mosh/ET/local/serial failure UI on isTerminalBootActive and harden the boot effect awaits. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): hide disconnect/reconnect on compact popup terminals Owned command popups use compactToolbar with a one-shot startup command. Exposing reconnect there can re-run that command; keep the controls on normal tabs/workspace panes only. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): use boot epoch so reconnect cannot revive aborted starts Disconnect alone flipping isBootActiveRef is not enough: an immediate reconnect re-arms boot, and a late startSSH from the aborted attempt can still attach. Capture a boot epoch per attempt and ignore stale attaches/UI. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): do not let stale attach abort a newer reconnect tryAttach failure for an expired boot epoch must close the orphan session only. Calling abortSessionStartAfterUnmount() would force disconnected on a reconnect that already re-armed boot. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): reject late host-key prompts after disconnect Disconnect can land before pendingHostKeyRequestId is set. Auto-deny onHostKeyVerification when boot is inactive or status is disconnected so approval UI cannot reopen on an aborted pane. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): cancel wake and MFA when status-bar disconnects Invalidate hibernation reconnect-wake tokens on disconnect so a late wake cannot re-arm boot. Reject/cancel keyboard-interactive prompts for disconnected panes and clear any already-queued MFA for that session. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): ignore stale SSH catch UI and password fallback Check boot attempt currency before resetting reconnect UI state on SSH start failure, and before launching key→password fallback after disconnect so a replacement reconnect is not interrupted. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): guard stale SSH progress and host-key prompts Ignore chain-progress callbacks from superseded boot attempts, and thread bootEpoch through SSH host-key verification so a late prompt from an aborted start cannot overwrite a replacement reconnect. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): correlate MFA and jump host-keys with boot epoch Forward bootEpoch through jump-host verification and keyboard-interactive prompts, and reject superseded MFA when the retained tab has already started a replacement reconnect. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): keep replacement SSH session alive across stale starts Skip closeSession for superseded starts while a newer boot still owns the shared sessionId, and avoid clearing MFA wait state before the attempt-freshness guard on SSH success. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): own shared sessionIds by boot epoch Claim SSH/local registry slots with bootEpoch so a stale start cannot overwrite a replacement, and make closeSession no-op when the payload epoch does not match the live session owner. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): claim bootEpoch for all reconnectable backends Pass bootEpoch through Telnet/Mosh/ET/serial starts, claim registry slots the same way as SSH/local, and dispose displaced owners when a newer boot replaces the shared sessionId. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): protect preload listeners and ET artifacts on displace Defer epoch-scoped closeSession listener teardown until main confirms ownership, and remove ET external-auth temp artifacts when a newer boot displaces the previous registry owner. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): clean rejected Mosh starts and keep replacement listeners Kill superseded Mosh/ET PTYs and auth temp files when claimSessionSlot rejects, and never clear shared preload listeners on epoch-scoped closes. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): settle superseded boots and stop displaced log streams Reject Telnet/SSH claim failures through Promise reject/failReuse instead of uncaught EventEmitter/.then throws, and stop a displaced session's log stream so a logging-disabled reconnect cannot append into the old file. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): keep woken runtime when disconnect cancels hibernate wake Disconnect invalidates in-flight hibernated reconnects with keep mode so a successful wake that already cleared hibernatedRef is not disposed into a dead pane that can never reconnect. Unmount still disposes orphan runtimes. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): bind reused SSH shellPid only to the claimed session Late PID discovery after Copy Tab reuse must not write onto a newer bootEpoch that already replaced the shared sessionId registry slot. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): await plugin cancel cleanup and clear boot epochs on teardown Track plugin start/cancel promises so Disconnect→Reconnect waits until the external session finishes unregistering, and stop unmount teardown from republishing boot epochs into the process-wide map. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): cancel SSH passphrase prompts on disconnect Register a pending-boot AbortSignal for SSH starts, abort it (and session- scoped passphrase requests) from closeSession even before a registry slot exists, and filter/drop late passphrase modals by boot epoch / disconnect. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): close owned boot epoch and scope passphrase cancels Capture the pre-bump epoch for disconnect/teardown closeSession so live transports are not skipped by epoch mismatch, cancel only passphrase prompts at or below that epoch, and revalidate boot currency after async passphrase lookups before queuing a modal. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): tag Telnet auto-login and Mosh ready with bootEpoch Emit bootEpoch on telnet auto-login and mosh:ready events so overlapping Disconnect→Reconnect boots ignore cross-delivered callbacks meant for an older shared sessionId. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): update disconnect assertion and cancel pending serial opens Align the disconnect source regression with invalidateBootEpochForClose, and abort in-flight serialPort.open attempts via pending boot AbortSignal so Disconnect→Reconnect cannot leave a stale open racing the replacement. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(terminal): keep flow-pause leases on skipped epoch closes Worker close:await previously cleared pause ownership in finally even when the worker returned skipped for an epoch mismatch, dropping the live replacement's lease. Only clear on non-skipped closes; epoch-scoped fire-and-forget close similarly defers to onSessionClosed. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
429 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript
429 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript
const test = require("node:test");
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const assert = require("node:assert/strict");
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const crypto = require("node:crypto");
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const {
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classifyHostKey,
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createHostVerifier,
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describeHostKey,
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handleResponse,
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normalizeFingerprint,
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} = require("./hostKeyVerifier.cjs");
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const makeRawPublicKey = (keyType, body = "trusted imported host key") => {
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const type = Buffer.from(keyType);
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const length = Buffer.alloc(4);
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length.writeUInt32BE(type.length, 0);
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return Buffer.concat([length, type, Buffer.from(body)]);
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};
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test("classifyHostKey prompts for unknown hosts", () => {
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "unknown");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey trusts a matching known host fingerprint", () => {
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: "SHA256:trusted-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "trusted-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "trusted");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey trusts a matching full known_hosts public key", () => {
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const rawKey = makeRawPublicKey("ssh-ed25519");
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const fingerprint = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(rawKey).digest("base64").replace(/=+$/g, "");
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: `ssh-ed25519 ${rawKey.toString("base64")}`,
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint,
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "trusted");
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});
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test("describeHostKey preserves the full public key from raw SSH key blobs", () => {
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const rawKey = makeRawPublicKey("ssh-ed25519");
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const result = describeHostKey(rawKey);
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assert.equal(result.keyType, "ssh-ed25519");
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assert.equal(result.publicKey, `ssh-ed25519 ${rawKey.toString("base64")}`);
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});
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test("classifyHostKey warns when a known host fingerprint changes", () => {
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "192.0.2.10",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: "SHA256:old-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "192.0.2.10",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "changed");
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assert.equal(result.knownHost?.id, "kh-1");
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assert.equal(result.expectedFingerprint, "old-key");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey treats the same hostname on a different port as unknown", () => {
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 2222,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: "SHA256:trusted-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "trusted-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "unknown");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey reports unknown when only the incoming key type is unknown", () => {
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// Without a confident key type from ssh2 we cannot tell whether this is a
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// rotation of the stored key or a brand-new algorithm; force the user back
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// through the first-time-trust path rather than scaring them with a
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// "fingerprint changed" warning (#972).
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: "SHA256:trusted-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "unknown",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "unknown");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey reports unknown when the stored record has no key type", () => {
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// Legacy / imported records sometimes have an empty or "unknown" keyType.
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// Promoting those to "changed" on every connect was the root cause of #972;
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// treat them as not-comparable so the user re-confirms cleanly.
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "unknown",
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publicKey: "SHA256:trusted-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "unknown");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey reports unknown when the server presents a different key type than any stored record", () => {
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// Server with ssh-rsa stored; presents ssh-ed25519 this time. OpenSSH treats
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// this as a new key offering, not a rotation; we match that behavior so a
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// host with multiple algorithms doesn't spam mismatch warnings on every
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// algorithm renegotiation.
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-rsa",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-rsa",
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publicKey: "SHA256:rsa-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "unknown");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey prefers exact key type mismatches when a host has multiple keys", () => {
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-rsa",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-rsa",
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publicKey: "SHA256:rsa-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}, {
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id: "kh-ed25519",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: "SHA256:ed25519-key",
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discoveredAt: 2,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "changed");
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assert.equal(result.knownHost?.id, "kh-ed25519");
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});
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test("classifyHostKey does not pick an arbitrary known host when incoming key type is unknown", () => {
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const result = classifyHostKey({
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-rsa",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-rsa",
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publicKey: "SHA256:rsa-key",
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}, {
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id: "kh-ed25519",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: "SHA256:ed25519-key",
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discoveredAt: 2,
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}],
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "unknown",
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fingerprint: "new-key",
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});
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assert.equal(result.status, "unknown");
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});
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test("normalizeFingerprint accepts SHA256-prefixed values", () => {
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assert.equal(normalizeFingerprint("SHA256:abc123==="), "abc123");
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});
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test("createHostVerifier accepts trusted host keys without prompting", async () => {
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const rawKey = Buffer.from("trusted server key");
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const fingerprint = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(rawKey).digest("base64").replace(/=+$/g, "");
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const sent = [];
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const sender = {
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id: 1,
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isDestroyed: () => false,
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send: (channel, payload) => sent.push({ channel, payload }),
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};
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const verifier = createHostVerifier({
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sender,
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sessionId: "session-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "unknown",
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publicKey: `SHA256:${fingerprint}`,
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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});
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const accepted = await new Promise((resolve) => verifier(rawKey, resolve));
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assert.equal(accepted, true);
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assert.deepEqual(sent, []);
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});
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test("createHostVerifier skips prompts when host key verification is disabled", async () => {
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const rawKey = Buffer.from("untrusted server key");
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const sent = [];
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const sender = {
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id: 1,
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isDestroyed: () => false,
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send: (channel, payload) => sent.push({ channel, payload }),
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};
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const verifier = createHostVerifier({
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sender,
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sessionId: "session-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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knownHosts: [],
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verifyHostKeys: false,
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});
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const accepted = await new Promise((resolve) => verifier(rawKey, resolve));
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assert.equal(accepted, true);
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assert.deepEqual(sent, []);
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});
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test("createHostVerifier accepts imported full known_hosts public keys without prompting", async () => {
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const rawKey = makeRawPublicKey("ssh-ed25519");
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const sent = [];
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const sender = {
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id: 1,
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isDestroyed: () => false,
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send: (channel, payload) => sent.push({ channel, payload }),
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};
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const verifier = createHostVerifier({
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sender,
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sessionId: "session-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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knownHosts: [{
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id: "kh-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
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publicKey: `ssh-ed25519 ${rawKey.toString("base64")}`,
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discoveredAt: 1,
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}],
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});
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const accepted = await new Promise((resolve) => verifier(rawKey, resolve));
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assert.equal(accepted, true);
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assert.deepEqual(sent, []);
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});
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test("createHostVerifier prompts for unknown host keys and waits for user response", async () => {
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const rawKey = Buffer.from("new server key");
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const sent = [];
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const sender = {
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id: 1,
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isDestroyed: () => false,
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send: (channel, payload) => sent.push({ channel, payload }),
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};
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const verifier = createHostVerifier({
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sender,
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sessionId: "session-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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knownHosts: [],
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});
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const acceptedPromise = new Promise((resolve) => verifier(rawKey, resolve));
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assert.equal(sent.length, 1);
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assert.equal(sent[0].channel, "netcatty:host-key:verify");
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assert.equal(sent[0].payload.hostname, "switch.local");
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assert.equal(sent[0].payload.status, "unknown");
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handleResponse({ sender: { id: sender.id } }, {
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requestId: sent[0].payload.requestId,
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accept: true,
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addToKnownHosts: true,
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});
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assert.equal(await acceptedPromise, true);
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});
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test("createHostVerifier forwards bootEpoch on host-key prompts", async () => {
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const rawKey = Buffer.from("new server key");
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const sent = [];
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const sender = {
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id: 1,
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isDestroyed: () => false,
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send: (channel, payload) => sent.push({ channel, payload }),
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};
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const verifier = createHostVerifier({
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sender,
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sessionId: "session-1",
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hostname: "switch.local",
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port: 22,
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knownHosts: [],
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bootEpoch: 7,
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});
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const acceptedPromise = new Promise((resolve) => verifier(rawKey, resolve));
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assert.equal(sent[0].payload.bootEpoch, 7);
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handleResponse({ sender: { id: sender.id } }, {
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requestId: sent[0].payload.requestId,
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accept: false,
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});
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assert.equal(await acceptedPromise, false);
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});
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test("createHostVerifier includes existing known host details when a key changes", async () => {
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// A well-formed wire blob so `describeHostKey` can recover keyType =
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// "ssh-ed25519"; that triggers the strict (host, port, type) mismatch
|
|
// branch with a stored record of the same type but different fingerprint.
|
|
const rawKey = makeRawPublicKey("ssh-ed25519", "changed server key");
|
|
const sent = [];
|
|
const sender = {
|
|
id: 1,
|
|
isDestroyed: () => false,
|
|
send: (channel, payload) => sent.push({ channel, payload }),
|
|
};
|
|
const verifier = createHostVerifier({
|
|
sender,
|
|
sessionId: "session-1",
|
|
hostname: "switch.local",
|
|
port: 22,
|
|
knownHosts: [{
|
|
id: "kh-1",
|
|
hostname: "switch.local",
|
|
port: 22,
|
|
keyType: "ssh-ed25519",
|
|
publicKey: "SHA256:old-key",
|
|
fingerprint: "old-key",
|
|
discoveredAt: 1,
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const acceptedPromise = new Promise((resolve) => verifier(rawKey, resolve));
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(sent.length, 1);
|
|
assert.equal(sent[0].channel, "netcatty:host-key:verify");
|
|
assert.equal(sent[0].payload.status, "changed");
|
|
assert.equal(sent[0].payload.knownHostId, "kh-1");
|
|
assert.equal(sent[0].payload.knownFingerprint, "old-key");
|
|
|
|
handleResponse({ sender: { id: sender.id } }, {
|
|
requestId: sent[0].payload.requestId,
|
|
accept: true,
|
|
addToKnownHosts: true,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
assert.equal(await acceptedPromise, true);
|
|
});
|