test(terminal): allow alternateScreen in prompt-security options

fix(terminal): exempt vim colon only on the alternate screen
A bare `:` on the primary screen can be `sudo -p ':'`. Vim command mode uses DEC 1049, so require alternateScreen before treating `:` as ex.
2026-10-29 18:11:40 +00:00 · 2026-09-21 15:58:36 +08:00 · 2026-09-21 15:49:23 +08:00 · 2026-09-21 15:35:40 +08:00 · 2026-09-21 15:18:39 +08:00
5 changed files with 33 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -1960,7 +1960,12 @@ const TerminalComponent: React.FC<TerminalProps> = ({
      sensitivePromptOutputTailRef.current,
      chunk,
    );
-    const promptSecurityOptions = { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: isNetworkDevice };
+    const promptSecurityOptions = {
+      allowHostStyleGreaterThan: isNetworkDevice,
+      alternateScreen: termRef.current
+        ? isTerminalAlternateScreenActive(termRef.current)
+        : false,
+    };
    if (typeof meta?.pluginPipelineSensitiveInput === "boolean") {
      passwordPromptActiveRef.current = meta.pluginPipelineSensitiveInput;
      if (meta.pluginPipelineSensitiveInput) {
@@ -168,7 +168,10 @@ test('password-prompt input is consumed before every semantic command callback',
 });

 test('terminal output treats unknown prompt-shaped input boundaries as sensitive', () => {
-  assert.match(terminalSource, /const promptSecurityOptions = \{ allowHostStyleGreaterThan: isNetworkDevice \};/);
+  assert.match(
+    terminalSource,
+    /const promptSecurityOptions = \{\s*allowHostStyleGreaterThan: isNetworkDevice,\s*alternateScreen: termRef\.current\s*\? isTerminalAlternateScreenActive\(termRef\.current\)\s*: false,\s*\};/,
+  );
  assert.match(terminalSource, /isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt\([\s\S]*?promptSecurityOptions/);
  assert.match(terminalSource, /passwordPromptActiveRef\.current = true;[\s\S]*?autocompleteCloseRef\.current\?\.\(\);/);
  assert.match(terminalSource, /isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt\([\s\S]*?passwordPromptActiveRef\.current = false;/);
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ function isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(value, options = {}) {
  const prompt = lastLogicalLine(value).trim();
  if (!prompt) return false;
  if (isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(prompt)) return true;
+  // Vim command-mode entry on the alternate screen. A bare `:` on the
+  // primary screen stays fail-closed (`sudo -p ':'`).
+  if (options.alternateScreen && /^:\s*$/.test(prompt)) return false;
  if (!/[:：>›»]\s*$/u.test(prompt)) return false;
  if (hasTypedInputAfterConfirmedPrompt(prompt, options)) return false;
  return !isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(prompt, options);
@@ -122,6 +122,16 @@ test('ordinary shell commands ending with a colon are not untrusted input prompt
  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Password: '), true);
 });

+test('vim ex command-line is not an untrusted input prompt (#3422)', () => {
+  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(':', { alternateScreen: true }), false);
+  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(': ', { alternateScreen: true }), false);
+  // Primary screen: `sudo -p ':'` stays fail-closed.
+  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(':'), true);
+  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(':', { alternateScreen: false }), true);
+  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Password:'), true);
+  assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Token: '), true);
+});
+
 test('renderer and main-process prompt classifiers stay aligned', () => {
  const cases: Array<[
    string,
@@ -130,6 +140,8 @@ test('renderer and main-process prompt classifiers stay aligned', () => {
  ]> = [
    ['Custom authentication> ', undefined, true],
    ['Please authenticate: ', undefined, true],
+    [':', { alternateScreen: true }, false],
+    [':', undefined, true],
    ['alice@host:~$ ', undefined, false],
    ['user@host:~$ lsof -i:', undefined, false],
    ['Challenge # 1:', undefined, true],
@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ export function isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(value: string): boolean {
 type ConfirmedPromptOptions = {
  /** Network-device shells commonly use a bare host name followed by `>`. */
  allowHostStyleGreaterThan?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * True when the terminal is on the alternate screen (DEC 1049). Used to
+   * tell vim's command-line `:` from a custom `sudo -p ':'` prompt.
+   */
+  alternateScreen?: boolean;
 };

 /**
@@ -192,6 +197,9 @@ export function isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(
  const prompt = lastLogicalLine(value).trim();
  if (!prompt) return false;
  if (isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(prompt)) return true;
+  // Vim command-mode entry on the alternate screen. A bare `:` on the
+  // primary screen stays fail-closed (`sudo -p ':'`).
+  if (options.alternateScreen && /^:\s*$/.test(prompt)) return false;
  if (!/[:：>›»]\s*$/u.test(prompt)) return false;
  // Mid-command punctuation after a real shell prompt must keep broadcasting
  // (#2709). Standalone `Label:` / `Custom>` challenges still fail closed.
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
bincxz	9e45982d0a	test(terminal): allow alternateScreen in prompt-security options	2026-09-21 15:58:36 +08:00
bincxz	5fc13a3c63	fix(terminal): exempt vim colon only on the alternate screen A bare `:` on the primary screen can be `sudo -p ':'`. Vim command mode uses DEC 1049, so require alternateScreen before treating `:` as ex.	2026-09-21 15:49:23 +08:00
bincxz	ced2ba0aa6	fix(terminal): only treat a bare colon as vim command-mode Codex: exempting every `:`-prefixed line would broadcast into custom prompts such as `sudo -p ':'`. The hang is the first `:` key; later `:w` no longer matches the trailing-colon heuristic.	2026-09-21 15:35:40 +08:00
bincxz	c91dc6c3e1	fix(terminal): keep broadcast going on vim ex command-line Broadcast pauses on fail-closed colon prompts so passwords are not copied to peers. Vim command mode's last line is a bare `:`, which matched that heuristic. Exempt lines that start with `:` so `:w` and friends stay in sync; `Password:` is unchanged.	2026-09-21 15:18:39 +08:00