Always try password before keyboard-interactive for the first factor. After
any partial success, prefer keyboard-interactive when the server still allows
it so multi-factor/EDR second factors work without a per-host switch. Remove
the requiresMfa UI and "remember MFA" checkbox; keep secondary-prompt
protections and hostId-aware password save.
Default stays password-first for ordinary hosts. Hosts with requiresMfa
prefer keyboard-interactive so EDR secondary factors are not skipped.
Secondary prompts can suggest enabling MFA mode for that host.
- Keep unlocked encrypted keys eligible after passphrase retry even when
the target is password-only (jump-chain retry path).
- Fire onAuthAttempt from the simple ordered auth handler so jump/SFTP
progress logs still update for password-only sessions.
Direct terminal sessions still tried ~/.ssh default keys after a saved
password failed, while jump-host and SFTP paths (buildAuthHandler) only
tried password. That made a wrong/stale host password look fine on direct
login but fail ProxyJump and SFTP until credentials were re-saved (e.g.
via Keychain).
Align startSession with #266 password-only policy and pin buildAuthHandler
behavior with regression tests.
Fixes#2079
Only suppress KI password auto-fill when the password method already
succeeded as a prior factor (EDR step-up). publickey/agent partialSuccess
still allows filling the saved host password into a following Password:
challenge (AuthenticationMethods publickey,keyboard-interactive).
Do not suppress saved-password prefill for multi-prompt keyboard-interactive
forms just because the challenge name mentions Duo or two-factor. Prefill
still targets only the password slot; skipAutoFill covers true second factors.
autoFilledOnce still blocks re-prefilling a stale login password into the
retry modal, but no longer hides the save checkbox. Saving is suppressed
only after partialSuccess or for an explicit single secondary/OTP field.
createOrderedStringAuthHandler no longer permanently consumes methods
that are merely absent from the current methodsLeft list. After a
publickey partialSuccess the server can re-request password even if it
was skipped earlier when only publickey was advertised.
allowSavePassword only turns off for post-first-factor rounds or a single
secondary/OTP field. A combined Password: + Verification code: challenge
still offers saving the password slot (Codex P3 on #2151).
Pass allowSavePassword=false for post-partialSuccess / EDR / multi-round
keyboard-interactive challenges so the modal cannot overwrite the host
login password with a secondary secret (Codex P2 on #2151).
Expand secondary-password regex to allow words between "secondary" and
"password", and scan keyboard-interactive name/instructions so Chinese
"二次认证密码" banners still block auto-fill when only the English field
label is in the prompt text.
Multi-round keyboard-interactive exchanges may not report partialSuccess
between prompts. After the first auto-fill, later password-looking rounds
open an empty modal so an EDR secondary secret is not pre-filled.
Track partialSuccess on simple/agent ordered auth handlers, omit saved
password from second-factor modal payloads, and align modal prefill
deny-list with the backend MFA vocabulary.
Do not auto-fill keyboard-interactive challenges that look like
secondary/EDR passwords, and skip saved-password auto-fill after a
first-factor partialSuccess so step-up prompts always surface the modal.
Do not trim password values when validating auth forms or attaching
credentials to SSH connect options, so a single-space password works
(issue #2036).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Fix default SSH key fallback after Keychain reference key selection.
Treat identityFilePaths as an explicit user key choice so terminal SSH sessions no longer fall back to ~/.ssh/id_* when a host uses a Keychain file-referenced key.
Fixes#1614
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Skip default-key primaries when explicit key config fails to load.
Address Codex review: if identityFilePaths were set but loadFirstIdentityFileForAuth returns null, do not install ~/.ssh/id_* as the primary auth method.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(ssh): repair mangled PEM private keys before parsing
A valid PEM key whose framing was damaged in transit — newlines
collapsed to spaces, turned into literal "\n", or lines indented —
fails ssh2's parser with "Unsupported key format" even though the key
material is intact. This commonly happens when a key is copy/pasted
through a field or app that strips line breaks. (follow-up to #1139)
When parsing fails, rebuild clean PEM framing from the BEGIN/END markers
(which survive newline loss) and the base64 body, then retry through the
existing parse and PKCS#8 conversion paths. The body is preserved
byte-for-byte and a repaired key is only used if it re-validates, so
this can never produce a different or invalid key. Encrypted legacy PEM
(Proc-Type/DEK-Info) and truncated keys are left untouched.
Refs #1139
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ssh): detect encryption on mangled OpenSSH keys
A mangled encrypted OpenSSH key (line breaks flattened to literal "\n")
was not recognized as encrypted: the literal escapes corrupt the base64
decode used to read the cipher name, so isKeyEncrypted() returned false
and preparePrivateKeyForAuth routed the key to the unencrypted branch
with no passphrase prompt — and the repaired candidate was discarded
because it can't parse without one.
Repair the PEM framing before reading the OpenSSH cipher name, so such
keys are detected as encrypted and reach the passphrase prompt, where
normalizePrivateKeyForSsh2(key, passphrase) already repairs and
validates them. Addresses Codex review feedback on #1147.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ssh2's key parser only accepts OpenSSH, legacy PKCS#1/SEC1 and PuTTY
keys, so PKCS#8 keys (-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- / BEGIN ENCRYPTED
PRIVATE KEY) fail with "Cannot parse privateKey: Unsupported key
format" even though they are valid and work in other clients such as
Termius. (#1139)
Add privateKeyNormalizer: when ssh2 can't parse a key but it is PKCS#8,
read it with Node's crypto and re-export RSA->PKCS#1 / EC->SEC1, the
legacy PEM forms ssh2 understands. Encrypted PKCS#8 is decrypted with
the passphrase first. Ed25519 (and other) PKCS#8 keys, which have no
legacy PEM form, now surface a clear "convert with ssh-keygen" message
instead of ssh2's opaque error.
Wired into sshAuthHelper's preparePrivateKeyForAuth and
loadIdentityFileForAuth, so SSH, SFTP and port-forwarding all benefit.
Also fixes a latent bug where a correct passphrase on an encrypted
PKCS#8 key was rejected and re-prompted indefinitely.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix#969: auto-fill saved password into PAM-style keyboard-interactive prompts
Servers running stock PAM Linux configurations (most distros) only advertise
`keyboard-interactive` as their auth method, not `password` — so even when
the user has saved a password on the host, Netcatty was popping a modal
asking them to type it again. Every connect ended up being a two-password
flow: one to dispatch, one in the modal.
The shared `createKeyboardInteractiveHandler` factory now recognizes the
classic "PAM-wrapped password" challenge (a single prompt with
`echo === false`) and finishes it with the saved password directly,
skipping the modal. Real multi-prompt or echo-visible challenges (2FA / OTP
/ security questions) still go to the modal as before, and a wrong-password
auto-fill on the first attempt falls back to the modal on the retry so the
user can correct it.
Also consolidated startSSHSession's inline keyboard-interactive handler —
which duplicated ~45 lines of the factory logic without the auto-fill
fix — to use the factory with progress callbacks. The chain / SFTP /
port-forwarding bridges already went through the factory and pick up the
auto-fill for free.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address Codex review: only auto-fill prompts that mention a password
The previous heuristic ("single prompt + echo=false + saved password →
auto-fill") would also fire for OTP / Duo / hardware-token challenges,
which are single hidden-echo prompts too. That would burn one auth
attempt per reconnect on those servers and could trip pam_faillock /
pam_tally2 lockout policies before the user ever saw the modal.
Add a prompt-text gate: auto-fill only when the prompt contains a known
password keyword (Latin "password" / "passwd"; CJK "密码" / "口令").
Custom-localized prompts that don't match fall through to the modal,
which is the same behavior as the pre-#969 baseline — strictly no
worse than before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address Codex review (round 2): exclude OTP vocabulary from auto-fill
The previous PASSWORD_PROMPT_PATTERN matched anything containing "password"
/ "passwd" / "密码" / "口令", which still let through OTP shapes that
happen to include those words: "Enter your one-time password", "动态密码"
(Chinese for "dynamic password" = OTP), "动态口令", "一次性密码", etc.
Add an OTP/MFA vocabulary check that runs before the password keyword
check. Any prompt containing OTP terminology (one-time, OTP, verification,
passcode, token, 2FA, two-factor, MFA, Duo, 动态, 一次性, 验证码, 令牌,
双因素, 多因素, 短信验证, 手机验证) is disqualified from auto-fill even
if it also matches the password keywords.
Tests cover both English "One-time password" and the three common Chinese
OTP phrasings, plus a regression guard that normal sudo-style password
prompts still auto-fill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>