Files
Netcatty/electron/bridges/sshBridge/systemKnownHosts.cjs
T
陈大猫andClaude Opus 4.8 c6552ddc75 fix: Mosh 模式显示主机信息(stats companion SSH 连接) (#1198) (#1213)
* Show host info for Mosh sessions via a stats companion SSH connection

Mosh sessions run over UDP through a local mosh-client PTY and carry no
ssh2 connection (session.conn), so getServerStats could not open an exec
channel and the terminal's host-info bar (CPU/memory/disk/network) stayed
empty — unlike SSH sessions (issue #1198).

Add a best-effort, non-interactive companion SSH connection that is opened
lazily on the first stats poll for a Mosh session, reusing the credentials
the Mosh handshake already validated, and assign it to session.conn so the
existing stats path works unchanged:

- electron/bridges/sshBridge/moshStatsConnection.cjs: new helper that
  builds the companion connection. It never prompts (only stored password,
  parseable private key, unencrypted/stored-passphrase identity files, or
  ssh-agent), shares one in-flight attempt across concurrent polls, treats
  auth rejection as permanent but transient errors as retryable, and skips
  host-key verification like the existing one-off execCommand path.
- sessionOps.getServerStats: establish the companion connection for Mosh
  sessions that lack session.conn before running the stats command;
  degrades gracefully to the existing "not connected" error otherwise.
- moshSession.swapToMoshClient: stash the handshake credentials and
  algorithm settings on session.moshStatsAuth once the handshake succeeds.
- terminalBridge closeSession / cleanupAllSessions and the mosh-client exit
  handler: tear down the companion connection (it has no session.stream).
- Forward legacyAlgorithms / skipEcdsaHostKey / algorithmOverrides through
  the renderer's Mosh starter and the bridge type so the companion
  negotiates the same algorithms the interactive session would.

Tests cover the helper (auth selection, agent fallback, dedup, permanent vs
transient failure, late-ready discard), the getServerStats integration, and
the moshStatsAuth stash + companion teardown on close.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: target SSH host and settle on mid-handshake close

- moshSession: store options.hostname (the SSH endpoint) on moshStatsAuth
  instead of parsed.host. A `MOSH IP` line advertises the UDP endpoint for
  mosh-client, which can differ from the SSH host on NAT / multi-homed
  setups; the companion is an SSH connection and must target the SSH host.
- moshStatsConnection: resolve the pending attempt from the "close" handler
  when the socket drops mid-handshake without a prior "ready"/"error", so an
  awaiting getServerStats call (and session.moshStatsConnPromise) cannot
  hang indefinitely. Treated as transient so the next poll may retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: keyboard-interactive password for stats companion

PAM-backed SSH servers often offer password auth only via
keyboard-interactive, not the plain "password" method. The Mosh handshake's
system ssh handles that through its PTY responder, so without it the
companion stats connection would fail auth on those hosts even with a saved
password, leaving the stats bar empty.

When a saved password is present, enable tryKeyboard and attach a
non-interactive keyboard-interactive handler that auto-fills the password
for a single password prompt (using the existing
isAutoFillablePasswordChallenge predicate) and finishes empty on
2FA/OTP/multi-prompt challenges. It auto-fills at most once so a wrong
password can't drive a retry loop, and it never shows a modal — the
companion stays fully non-interactive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: verify host key before sending a saved password

A background companion connection that auto-submits a saved password to an
unverified host could disclose it to a spoofed / MITM server (P1). Gate
password auth (plain and keyboard-interactive) behind a silent, trusted-only
host-key check against Netcatty's known-hosts store:

- moshStatsConnection: when the companion would authenticate with a
  password, attach an ssh2 hostVerifier that accepts only a key already
  "trusted" in known-hosts (via hostKeyVerifier.classifyHostKey) and rejects
  unknown/changed keys outright — no prompt, so the password is never sent to
  an unvetted host and no host-key dialog pops for a background poll.
  Public-key / agent auth proves possession via a signature and discloses no
  reusable secret, so it is not gated (matches the existing execCommand
  precedent; the handshake already vetted the host via system ssh).
- Thread knownHosts through the renderer Mosh starter, the bridge type, and
  session.moshStatsAuth.

Note: a password-auth Mosh host that Netcatty has never seen via its own SSH
path (so it is absent from Netcatty's known-hosts) will not get the stats
companion until its key is known — the safe default. Key/agent-auth hosts are
unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: transient pre-handshake polls and agent+password auth

Two functional gaps in the stats companion:

- Missing moshStatsAuth is now transient, not permanent. The renderer can
  mark a Mosh session "connected" (and start polling) from the SSH
  bootstrap's visible PTY output before the swap to mosh-client assigns
  moshStatsAuth. Previously that first poll set moshStatsConnFailed
  permanently, so the companion was never attempted after the handshake
  actually completed. Now it just returns null and a later poll retries.

- A saved password no longer suppresses ssh-agent auth. A public-key host
  that authenticates via the agent may still carry a stored password; the
  companion now offers the agent alongside the password (ssh2 tries agent
  first) instead of attempting password-only and failing permanently. An
  explicit private key still suppresses the agent fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: gate password at authHandler, not whole connection

The previous fix installed a trusted-only hostVerifier whenever a password
was present. Because ssh2 verifies the host before any auth method, that
rejected the entire connection on a host absent from Netcatty's known-hosts
— blocking key/agent auth too, even though those never need to send the
password.

Move the gate from the transport to the auth layer:

- A trust-tracking hostVerifier records whether the live host key is trusted
  (during the transport handshake) and then accepts the transport so
  public-key / agent auth can proceed on any host.
- A function-form authHandler offers none -> agent -> publickey always, and
  appends password + keyboard-interactive only when the host key is trusted.

Result: key/agent auth works on hosts Netcatty hasn't vetted, while a saved
password is still never sent to an untrusted host. Public-key / agent auth
remains ungated (no reusable secret is disclosed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: isolate Mosh stats connection from session.conn

Storing the stats companion on session.conn made it look like the session's
primary interactive SSH connection. Other bridges key off session.conn —
getSessionPwd assumes its exec channel is a sibling of the interactive shell,
and SFTP / MCP exec run over session.conn — but a Mosh session's shell lives
on the UDP mosh-client, not this background connection. After a stats poll
they could return a bogus cwd or operate over the wrong connection.

Keep the companion strictly on session.moshStatsConn:

- ensureMoshStatsConnection stores/reuses/clears only session.moshStatsConn.
- getServerStats reads session.conn || session.moshStatsConn (real SSH still
  uses conn; Mosh uses the companion) and only opens one when neither exists.
- closeSession / cleanupAllSessions / the mosh-client exit handler tear down
  session.moshStatsConn.

This leaves session.conn untouched for Mosh, so getSessionPwd / SFTP / MCP
exec behave exactly as before (no primary SSH connection for Mosh).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: don't count pre-handshake Mosh polls as failures

useServerStats gives up after 3 consecutive failures. A Mosh session can be
marked "connected" (and start polling) from the SSH bootstrap's visible
output before swapToMoshClient stores moshStatsAuth, during which
ensureMoshStatsConnection returns null. Previously getServerStats reported
that as a normal failure, so a handshake taking ~15s (3 polls) would
permanently disable stats for the session even after credentials became
available.

Introduce a `pending` result:

- getServerStats returns { success: false, pending: true } for a Mosh session
  that has no connection yet and no moshStatsAuth and hasn't permanently
  failed. Once moshStatsAuth is set (or the companion permanently fails), it
  reports a normal failure again.
- useServerStats treats `pending` as neutral: it does not update stats and
  does not increment the consecutive-failure counter, so polling continues
  until the handshake completes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address codex review: verify host key for all Mosh stats companion auth

The companion installed a trust-tracking host verifier only when a saved
password was present; key/agent-only connections fell back to ssh2's
default of accepting any host key. A background, user-invisible connection
that authenticated against an unverified host could let a MITM/DNS-spoofed
host feed bogus host-info to the user and enumerate the ssh-agent's public
keys — breaking the host-key guarantee the interactive session enforces.

Attach the host verifier for every auth method and reject an unknown or
changed host key outright (never prompting; stats just stay empty). Treat
an untrusted host as a permanent failure so polling stops reconnecting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mosh): trust system known_hosts for the stats companion host-key check

The Mosh stats companion opens a background ssh2 connection and only rides
on a host whose live key is already trusted, rejecting unknown/changed keys
as a permanent failure. Trust was sourced solely from Netcatty's in-app
known-hosts snapshot (options.knownHosts).

But a Mosh session is bootstrapped by the system `ssh`, which vets and
records the host key in the user's OpenSSH known_hosts (~/.ssh/known_hosts,
etc). Netcatty's snapshot is never updated by that handshake, so a host
trusted purely via system ssh was misread as "unknown" and the companion
permanently disabled — Mosh stats never appeared unless the user manually
scanned/imported the host into Netcatty (codex P2).

Add a system-known_hosts trust source (systemKnownHosts.cjs) and consult it
in the companion verifier when the in-app snapshot does not already vouch
for the key. Matching is by the LIVE key's SHA-256 fingerprint, so trust is
granted only for the exact key the user's own OpenSSH already trusts; an
arbitrary or mismatched key is never accepted. Unknown/changed keys stay
rejected and remain a permanent failure.

The parser handles the OpenSSH known_hosts(5) format that the in-app scan
parser does not fully cover for matching: plain hosts, comma lists,
[host]:port, hashed |1|salt|HMAC-SHA1(salt,token) entries (with the
bracketed token for non-default ports, verified against ssh-keygen -H),
multiple key types, @revoked (forces NOT trusted) and @cert-authority
(skipped). Wildcard/negation patterns are deliberately not honored. Paths
mirror localFsBridge.readKnownHosts and are cross-platform (incl. Windows
%PROGRAMDATA%\ssh\known_hosts). All errors fail closed.

ssh2 ships no known_hosts parser, so this is implemented in CommonJS using
node:crypto and covered by unit tests (real ssh-keygen hashed fixtures,
revoked/cert-authority, fingerprint mismatch, fail-closed) plus companion
integration tests (system-only trust accepts; neither source trusts ->
rejected + permanent; key rotation not rescued; optional-dependency safety).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 16:26:27 +08:00

307 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* System OpenSSH known_hosts trust source.
*
* Mosh sessions are bootstrapped by the *system* `ssh`, which records the
* server's host key in the user's OpenSSH known_hosts files (e.g.
* `~/.ssh/known_hosts`). That file — not Netcatty's in-app known-hosts vault —
* is the real trust source for a Mosh connection: the user vetted and accepted
* the key through OpenSSH's own prompt during the handshake.
*
* The stats companion (moshStatsConnection.cjs) opens a *second*, background
* ssh2 connection and must only ever ride on a host whose key is already
* trusted. Netcatty's vault snapshot does not get updated when OpenSSH accepts
* a key, so a host trusted purely via the system would be wrongly classified as
* "unknown" and the companion permanently disabled (issue: Mosh stats never
* appear unless the user manually imports/scans the host into Netcatty).
*
* This module parses the system known_hosts files and answers a single
* question: "does a non-revoked system entry for this (host, port) record the
* EXACT public key the server just presented?" — matched by the key's SHA-256
* fingerprint. It only ever *adds* trust for keys the user's own OpenSSH
* already trusts; it never accepts an unknown or mismatched key. Unknown /
* changed keys remain rejected by the caller.
*
* Format handling (OpenSSH known_hosts(5)):
* - comments (`#…`) and blank lines are ignored;
* - plain host tokens, comma-separated host lists, and `[host]:port`;
* - hashed entries `|1|<b64 salt>|<b64 HMAC-SHA1(salt, token)>` — the token
* hashed is the canonical name OpenSSH uses (`[host]:port` for a non-default
* port, the bare host otherwise), matched by recomputing the HMAC;
* - marker lines: `@revoked` entries are treated as explicitly NOT trusted
* (a revoked key never grants trust, even if its fingerprint matches);
* `@cert-authority` lines are skipped (they delegate to a CA, not a literal
* host key, which the fingerprint-equality check cannot model);
* - multiple key types / multiple lines per host.
*
* Negation patterns (`!pattern`) and wildcard patterns (`*`, `?`) are NOT
* honored for matching: a wildcard could make an unrelated entry vouch for a
* host whose key we have not actually seen. We only trust exact host-token
* matches, which is the safe subset for "has the user's OpenSSH seen THIS key
* for THIS host". This is intentionally conservative — failing to match just
* leaves the Mosh stats bar empty (graceful degradation), never weakens
* security.
*/
function createSystemKnownHostsApi(ctx) {
const { fs, path, os, crypto, log } = ctx;
const HASH_MARKER = "|1|";
const normalizeHostname = (value) => String(value || "").trim().toLowerCase();
const stripFingerprintPadding = (value) =>
String(value || "").replace(/=+$/g, "");
// SHA-256 base64 fingerprint (no padding) of an OpenSSH public-key blob,
// computed the same way the live host-key verifier does so the two values
// are directly comparable.
const fingerprintFromKeyBlob = (base64Key) => {
if (typeof base64Key !== "string" || base64Key.length === 0) return "";
let blob;
try {
blob = Buffer.from(base64Key, "base64");
} catch {
return "";
}
if (blob.length === 0) return "";
return stripFingerprintPadding(
crypto.createHash("sha256").update(blob).digest("base64"),
);
};
// The canonical host token OpenSSH uses as the hashed/plain lookup key:
// the bare host on the default port, `[host]:port` otherwise. Built for the
// host exactly as supplied and (when different) its lowercase form, so a
// case-insensitive hostname still matches a hashed entry hashed in either
// case. Only ever broadens matching against the user's own trusted file.
const buildLookupTokens = (hostname, port) => {
const raw = String(hostname || "").trim();
if (!raw) return [];
const variants = new Set([raw]);
const lower = raw.toLowerCase();
variants.add(lower);
const tokens = new Set();
const usePort = Number.isFinite(port) && Number(port) !== 22;
for (const variant of variants) {
tokens.add(usePort ? `[${variant}]:${Number(port)}` : variant);
}
return [...tokens];
};
// Does a plain (non-hashed) host field cover (hostname, port)? Handles
// comma-separated lists and `[host]:port`. Wildcards and negations are not
// honored (see module header).
const plainHostFieldMatches = (hostField, hostname, port) => {
const wantHost = normalizeHostname(hostname);
if (!wantHost) return false;
const wantPort = Number.isFinite(port) ? Number(port) : 22;
const patterns = String(hostField || "").split(",");
for (const pattern of patterns) {
const token = pattern.trim();
if (!token) continue;
// Skip negations and wildcard patterns — not a safe exact match.
if (token.startsWith("!") || token.includes("*") || token.includes("?")) {
continue;
}
const bracket = token.match(/^\[([^\]]+)\]:(\d+)$/);
if (bracket) {
if (
normalizeHostname(bracket[1]) === wantHost &&
Number.parseInt(bracket[2], 10) === wantPort
) {
return true;
}
continue;
}
// A bare token implies the default SSH port.
if (normalizeHostname(token) === wantHost && wantPort === 22) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
};
// Does a hashed host field (`|1|salt|hash`) cover (hostname, port)? Matches
// by recomputing HMAC-SHA1(salt, token) for each canonical lookup token.
const hashedHostFieldMatches = (hostField, hostname, port) => {
const field = String(hostField || "");
if (!field.startsWith(HASH_MARKER)) return false;
const rest = field.slice(HASH_MARKER.length);
const sep = rest.indexOf("|");
if (sep <= 0) return false;
const saltB64 = rest.slice(0, sep);
const expected = rest.slice(sep + 1);
if (!saltB64 || !expected) return false;
let salt;
try {
salt = Buffer.from(saltB64, "base64");
} catch {
return false;
}
if (salt.length === 0) return false;
let expectedBuf;
try {
expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, "base64");
} catch {
return false;
}
if (expectedBuf.length === 0) return false;
// Use the host string exactly as supplied (and its lowercase form) when
// building tokens — a hashed entry preserves the literal name OpenSSH saw.
for (const token of buildLookupTokens(hostname, port)) {
let computed;
try {
computed = crypto.createHmac("sha1", salt).update(token).digest();
} catch {
continue;
}
if (
computed.length === expectedBuf.length &&
crypto.timingSafeEqual(computed, expectedBuf)
) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
};
const hostFieldMatches = (hostField, hostname, port) => {
if (String(hostField || "").startsWith(HASH_MARKER)) {
return hashedHostFieldMatches(hostField, hostname, port);
}
return plainHostFieldMatches(hostField, hostname, port);
};
// Parse one known_hosts line into { revoked, certAuthority, hostField,
// keyType, fingerprint } or null when it is a comment / blank / malformed.
// The fingerprint is the SHA-256 of the line's key blob.
const parseKnownHostsLine = (rawLine) => {
const line = String(rawLine || "").trim();
if (!line || line.startsWith("#")) return null;
let rest = line;
let revoked = false;
let certAuthority = false;
// Leading markers: `@revoked` / `@cert-authority` (one per line in
// practice). Consume any leading `@…` token.
while (rest.startsWith("@")) {
const spaceIdx = rest.search(/\s/);
if (spaceIdx < 0) return null;
const marker = rest.slice(0, spaceIdx);
if (marker === "@revoked") revoked = true;
else if (marker === "@cert-authority") certAuthority = true;
// Unknown markers are ignored but still consumed.
rest = rest.slice(spaceIdx).trim();
}
const parts = rest.split(/\s+/);
if (parts.length < 3) return null;
const [hostField, keyType, keyBlob] = parts;
if (!hostField || !keyType || !keyBlob) return null;
const fingerprint = fingerprintFromKeyBlob(keyBlob);
if (!fingerprint) return null;
return { revoked, certAuthority, hostField, keyType, fingerprint };
};
// The OpenSSH default trust files, mirroring localFsBridge.readKnownHosts so
// the companion trusts exactly what the user's system ssh would.
const getSystemKnownHostsPaths = () => {
const homeDir = os.homedir();
const paths = [path.join(homeDir, ".ssh", "known_hosts")];
if (process.platform === "win32") {
paths.push(
path.join(process.env.PROGRAMDATA || "C:\\ProgramData", "ssh", "known_hosts"),
);
} else {
paths.push("/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts");
}
return paths;
};
const readSystemKnownHostsContent = () => {
let combined = "";
for (const filePath of getSystemKnownHostsPaths()) {
let content;
try {
content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8");
} catch {
// Missing / unreadable file is expected (e.g. no /etc/ssh on macOS).
continue;
}
if (content && content.length > 0) {
combined += combined ? `\n${content}` : content;
}
}
return combined;
};
/**
* Is the host key the server just presented already trusted by the user's
* system OpenSSH known_hosts?
*
* Returns true ONLY when a non-revoked plain/hashed entry for (hostname,
* port) records a key whose SHA-256 fingerprint equals `fingerprint`. A
* `@revoked` entry that matches the fingerprint forces a hard `false` — a
* revoked key must never be trusted, even if an older non-revoked entry also
* lists it. Any read/parse error fails closed (returns false).
*
* @param {object} params
* @param {string} params.hostname - SSH host the companion targets.
* @param {number} [params.port=22] - SSH port.
* @param {string} params.fingerprint - SHA-256 base64 (no padding, no
* `SHA256:` prefix) of the live host key.
* @returns {boolean}
*/
const isHostKeyTrustedBySystem = ({ hostname, port = 22, fingerprint } = {}) => {
const wantFingerprint = stripFingerprintPadding(fingerprint);
if (!hostname || !wantFingerprint) return false;
let content;
try {
content = readSystemKnownHostsContent();
} catch (err) {
log?.(
"[Mosh] failed to read system known_hosts:",
err?.message || String(err),
);
return false;
}
if (!content) return false;
let trusted = false;
for (const rawLine of content.split(/\r?\n/)) {
const entry = parseKnownHostsLine(rawLine);
if (!entry) continue;
// @cert-authority delegates to a CA rather than pinning a literal host
// key; the fingerprint-equality model does not apply, so skip it.
if (entry.certAuthority) continue;
if (entry.fingerprint !== wantFingerprint) continue;
if (!hostFieldMatches(entry.hostField, hostname, port)) continue;
// A matching @revoked entry is an explicit "never trust this key" and
// overrides any non-revoked match.
if (entry.revoked) return false;
trusted = true;
}
return trusted;
};
return {
isHostKeyTrustedBySystem,
// Exposed for unit testing.
parseKnownHostsLine,
hostFieldMatches,
plainHostFieldMatches,
hashedHostFieldMatches,
fingerprintFromKeyBlob,
buildLookupTokens,
getSystemKnownHostsPaths,
};
}
module.exports = { createSystemKnownHostsApi };