Files
Netcatty/domain/terminalPromptSecurity.test.ts
T
陈大猫 f5edd32366 fix(terminal): keep broadcast through command colons (#2715)
* fix(terminal): keep broadcast through command colons

Treat trailing colons after a confirmed shell prompt as typed command
input so workspace broadcast is not paused mid-command (#2709).

Require terminator + whitespace so mid-label shapes like Challenge #1:
stay fail-closed; standalone auth prompts remain untrusted.

* fix(terminal): require real PS1 body for colon broadcast bypass

Title-case challenge labels that embed shell markers (Challenge # 1:,
Account $ code:) must stay fail-closed. Only bare markers, user@host,
paths, shell-version PS1s, and lowercase identities count as a real
prompt prefix for the #2709 mid-command colon exemption.
2026-08-05 10:08:38 +08:00

118 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript

import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import test from 'node:test';
import {
appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail,
isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt,
isSensitiveTerminalChallenge,
isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt,
shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider,
} from './terminalPromptSecurity.ts';
test('terminal prompt security recognizes password, MFA, OTP, PIN, and CJK challenges', () => {
const challenges = [
'Password: ',
'Enter passphrase> ',
'OTP> 123456',
'One-time password: 123456',
'Verification code> 123456',
'Duo passcode: 123456',
'MFA token: 123456',
'Authentication code: 123456',
'Security PIN: 123456',
'验证码> 123456',
'动态口令:123456',
'二次认证密码:123456',
];
for (const challenge of challenges) {
assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(challenge), true, challenge);
}
assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge('password authentication succeeded'), false);
assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge('echo OTP'), false);
});
test('terminal prompt security combines split output chunks within a bounded logical line', () => {
let tail = appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail('', '\u001b[33mVerifi');
tail = appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail(tail, 'cation code\u001b[0m> ');
assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(tail), true);
tail = appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail(tail, '\r\nuser@host:~$ ');
assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(tail), false);
assert.ok(tail.length <= 2_048);
});
test('terminal prompt security positively confirms shell prompts and fails closed on ambiguous prompts', () => {
const confirmed = [
'$ ',
'root# ',
'user@host:~/repo$ ',
'➜ ~/repo ',
'\uE0B0 ',
'PS C:\\Users\\alice> ',
'C:\\Users\\alice> ',
'user@host> ',
];
for (const prompt of confirmed) {
assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(prompt), true, prompt);
}
assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt('OTP> '), false);
assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt('custom> '), false);
assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt('router> ', { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: true }), true);
});
test('plugin terminal completion policy requires a non-sensitive confirmed shell prompt', () => {
assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
sensitiveInputActive: false,
promptText: 'user@host:~$ ',
}), true);
assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
sensitiveInputActive: true,
promptText: 'user@host:~$ ',
}), false);
assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
sensitiveInputActive: false,
promptText: 'OTP> ',
}), false);
assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
sensitiveInputActive: false,
promptText: 'custom> ',
}), false);
});
test('unknown prompt-shaped authentication boundaries fail closed', () => {
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Custom authentication> '), true);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Please authenticate: '), true);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('alice@host:~$ '), false);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> ', { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: true }), false);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> '), true);
});
test('ordinary shell commands ending with a colon are not untrusted input prompts (#2709)', () => {
// Broadcast pauses while passwordPromptActive is sticky. Typing `lsof -i:`
// must not trip the fail-closed colon heuristic, or peers miss the rest.
const commandLines = [
'user@host:~$ lsof -i:',
'bash-5.2$ lsof -i:',
'root# lsof -i:',
'PS C:\\Users\\alice> lsof -i:',
'C:\\Users\\alice> lsof -i:',
];
for (const line of commandLines) {
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(line), false, line);
}
assert.equal(
isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> show ip:', { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: true }),
false,
);
// Bare host-style prompts stay fail-closed unless explicitly allowed.
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> show ip:'), true);
// Mid-label `#` is not a prompt boundary (no whitespace after `#`).
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Challenge #1:'), true);
// Markers inside English challenge labels must not look like a shell PS1.
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Challenge # 1:'), true);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Account $ code:'), true);
// Standalone auth-shaped lines without a confirmed shell prompt still fail closed.
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Please authenticate: '), true);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Token: '), true);
assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Password: '), true);
});