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* fix(terminal): keep broadcast through command colons Treat trailing colons after a confirmed shell prompt as typed command input so workspace broadcast is not paused mid-command (#2709). Require terminator + whitespace so mid-label shapes like Challenge #1: stay fail-closed; standalone auth prompts remain untrusted. * fix(terminal): require real PS1 body for colon broadcast bypass Title-case challenge labels that embed shell markers (Challenge # 1:, Account $ code:) must stay fail-closed. Only bare markers, user@host, paths, shell-version PS1s, and lowercase identities count as a real prompt prefix for the #2709 mid-command colon exemption.
118 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import test from 'node:test';
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import {
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appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail,
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isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt,
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isSensitiveTerminalChallenge,
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isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt,
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shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider,
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} from './terminalPromptSecurity.ts';
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test('terminal prompt security recognizes password, MFA, OTP, PIN, and CJK challenges', () => {
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const challenges = [
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'Password: ',
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'Enter passphrase> ',
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'OTP> 123456',
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'One-time password: 123456',
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'Verification code> 123456',
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'Duo passcode: 123456',
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'MFA token: 123456',
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'Authentication code: 123456',
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'Security PIN: 123456',
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'验证码> 123456',
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'动态口令:123456',
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'二次认证密码:123456',
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];
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for (const challenge of challenges) {
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assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(challenge), true, challenge);
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}
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assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge('password authentication succeeded'), false);
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assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge('echo OTP'), false);
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});
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test('terminal prompt security combines split output chunks within a bounded logical line', () => {
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let tail = appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail('', '\u001b[33mVerifi');
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tail = appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail(tail, 'cation code\u001b[0m> ');
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assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(tail), true);
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tail = appendTerminalPromptSecurityTail(tail, '\r\nuser@host:~$ ');
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assert.equal(isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(tail), false);
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assert.ok(tail.length <= 2_048);
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});
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test('terminal prompt security positively confirms shell prompts and fails closed on ambiguous prompts', () => {
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const confirmed = [
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'$ ',
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'root# ',
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'user@host:~/repo$ ',
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'➜ ~/repo ',
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'\uE0B0 ',
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'PS C:\\Users\\alice> ',
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'C:\\Users\\alice> ',
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'user@host> ',
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];
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for (const prompt of confirmed) {
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assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(prompt), true, prompt);
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}
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assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt('OTP> '), false);
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assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt('custom> '), false);
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assert.equal(isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt('router> ', { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: true }), true);
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});
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test('plugin terminal completion policy requires a non-sensitive confirmed shell prompt', () => {
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assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
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sensitiveInputActive: false,
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promptText: 'user@host:~$ ',
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}), true);
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assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
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sensitiveInputActive: true,
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promptText: 'user@host:~$ ',
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}), false);
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assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
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sensitiveInputActive: false,
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promptText: 'OTP> ',
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}), false);
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assert.equal(shouldUsePluginTerminalCompletionProvider({
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sensitiveInputActive: false,
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promptText: 'custom> ',
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}), false);
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});
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test('unknown prompt-shaped authentication boundaries fail closed', () => {
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Custom authentication> '), true);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Please authenticate: '), true);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('alice@host:~$ '), false);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> ', { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: true }), false);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> '), true);
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});
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test('ordinary shell commands ending with a colon are not untrusted input prompts (#2709)', () => {
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// Broadcast pauses while passwordPromptActive is sticky. Typing `lsof -i:`
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// must not trip the fail-closed colon heuristic, or peers miss the rest.
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const commandLines = [
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'user@host:~$ lsof -i:',
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'bash-5.2$ lsof -i:',
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'root# lsof -i:',
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'PS C:\\Users\\alice> lsof -i:',
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'C:\\Users\\alice> lsof -i:',
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];
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for (const line of commandLines) {
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(line), false, line);
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}
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assert.equal(
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isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> show ip:', { allowHostStyleGreaterThan: true }),
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false,
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);
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// Bare host-style prompts stay fail-closed unless explicitly allowed.
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('router> show ip:'), true);
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// Mid-label `#` is not a prompt boundary (no whitespace after `#`).
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Challenge #1:'), true);
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// Markers inside English challenge labels must not look like a shell PS1.
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Challenge # 1:'), true);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Account $ code:'), true);
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// Standalone auth-shaped lines without a confirmed shell prompt still fail closed.
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Please authenticate: '), true);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Token: '), true);
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assert.equal(isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt('Password: '), true);
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});
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