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* fix(credentials): stop double-encrypting undecryptable safeStorage blobs When local decrypt failed (e.g. OSCrypt key churn after reboot), encrypt used to wrap the leftover enc:v1 ciphertext again, permanently poisoning the vault. Startup sync could also push those placeholders to cloud and make download restore the same poison. - Keep real enc:v1 blobs unchanged on encrypt (header check, no wrap) - Strip device-bound placeholders when applying portable sync payloads - Guard startup local-wins / merge round-trips before upload - Skip vault init re-encrypt writes when secrets are still undecrypted Fixes #2702 Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): strip enc:v1 secrets from smart-merge uploads Bugbot found that after local apply sanitized placeholders, legacy v1 smart-merge could still decrypt an unstripped remote, merge it, and re-upload the poison. Strip device-bound credentials on remote decrypt and again on the merged payload before upload. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P2 review on #2702 - Always re-encrypt vault init batches so plaintext siblings are not left unprotected when one record is a stale enc:v1 placeholder - Sanitize device-bound secrets before convergent restore prepare so CRDT replica commit matches vault import - Require a complete safeStorage blob (header + min 31 bytes) before treating enc:v1 as ciphertext; encrypt header-only coincidences Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P1 review on #2702 - Decode enc:v1 payloads with atob in the renderer-safe domain helper - Heal poisoned remote secrets from local/base before smart-merge so good credentials are not discarded as remote-only deletions - Keep post-merge strip so leftover enc:v1 never uploads Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P1 CBC min and startup heal - Accept 19-byte v10/v11 CBC OSCrypt blobs (not only 31-byte GCM) - Heal poisoned remote secrets before startup smart-merge - Strip unresolved placeholders on merge round-trip upload Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): sanitize payloads at every apply/commit boundary Codex P1: vault apply stripped enc:v1 while commitRemoteInspection and convergent materialization could keep the poison. Sanitize merged/remote payloads before apply+base commit, strip on CRDT materialization, and sanitize convergent apply inputs. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): heal local and remote secrets before smart-merge Smart-merge could select a locally-changed entity whose only secret delta was enc:v1 poison, then strip and upload empty secrets. Heal both sides from the opposite payload/base before merge on all sync paths. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): keep enc:v1 intact during convergent materialize Stripping device-bound secrets inside materializeSyncPayloadFromConvergentState broke envelope validation for poisoned-but-consistent v2 snapshots, so decrypt could not hydrate the clouds #2702 needs to recover. Portable stripping stays at apply/upload boundaries. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): detect Windows DPAPI by decoded header bytes Real DPAPI blobs start with 01 00 00 00 d0 8c... and base64-encode as AQAAANCM..., so the previous AQAAAA string prefix rejected them and allowed double-wrapping after key rotation. Match decoded headers in both the main-process bridge and renderer predicate. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): use complete enc:v1 fixtures for stricter detector Short placeholders like enc:v1:djEwAAAA no longer pass the platform header + minimum-size checks. Update auth/SFTP/proxy/sync fixtures to full v10-shaped blobs so npm test matches production validation. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): treat preferred credential deletions as authoritative When healing enc:v1 before merge, an empty/missing secret on a present preferred entity is an intentional clear and must not be revived from base. Only fall back to base when preferred is absent or also poisoned. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): reject impossible v10/v11 ciphertext lengths Accept only CBC-aligned sizes (19+16n) or GCM-sized blobs (>=31) so coincidental enc:v1 plaintext of intermediate length is encrypted instead of treated as an undecryptable placeholder. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): require full DPAPI provider GUID signature Accept Windows safeStorage blobs only when they start with version 01 00 00 00 plus provider GUID df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb, so coincidental 01 00 00 00 prefixes are not treated as ciphertext. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
71 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
71 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import test from 'node:test';
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import {
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isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable,
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isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl,
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pluginProtocolForProvider,
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sanitizePluginConnection,
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} from './pluginConnection.ts';
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test('plugin connection profiles preserve opaque configuration when their provider is absent', () => {
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const providerId = 'com.example.transport.connection';
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const configuration = { endpoint: 'example', nested: { mode: 'safe' }, ports: [22, 443] };
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const result = sanitizePluginConnection({
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providerId,
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configuration,
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authenticationProviderId: 'com.example.transport.authentication',
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credentialId: 'credential-reference-1234',
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}, pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId));
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assert.deepEqual(result, {
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providerId,
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configuration,
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authenticationProviderId: 'com.example.transport.authentication',
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credentialId: 'credential-reference-1234',
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});
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assert.notEqual(result?.configuration, configuration);
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});
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test('plugin connection profiles fail closed on protocol ownership mismatches and unsafe JSON', () => {
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const providerId = 'com.example.transport.connection';
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assert.equal(sanitizePluginConnection({ providerId, configuration: {} }, 'plugin:other.plugin.connection'), undefined);
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assert.equal(sanitizePluginConnection({ providerId, configuration: { value: Number.NaN } }, pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId)), undefined);
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assert.equal(sanitizePluginConnection({ providerId, configuration: { constructor: 'spoof' } }, pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId)), undefined);
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});
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test('plugin connection profiles preserve explicit null configuration', () => {
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const providerId = 'com.example.transport.connection';
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assert.deepEqual(
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sanitizePluginConnection(
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{ providerId, configuration: null },
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pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId),
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),
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{ providerId, configuration: null },
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);
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});
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test('plugin credentials are selectable only after secure catalog publication', () => {
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const credentialId = 'credential-reference-0001';
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const published = new Set([credentialId]);
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assert.equal(isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'secret', published), true);
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assert.equal(isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'secret', new Set()), false);
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assert.equal(
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isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'enc:v1:djEwdGVzdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==', published),
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false,
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);
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assert.equal(
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isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'x'.repeat((64 * 1024) + 1), published),
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false,
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);
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});
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test('plugin authentication URLs require HTTPS except for loopback HTTP callbacks', () => {
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('https://login.example.com/authorize'), true);
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://localhost:44123/callback'), true);
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://127.0.0.1:44123/callback'), true);
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://[::1]:44123/callback'), true);
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://login.example.com/authorize'), false);
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('https://user:password@login.example.com/authorize'), false);
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assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('javascript:alert(1)'), false);
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});
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