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* fix(credentials): stop double-encrypting undecryptable safeStorage blobs When local decrypt failed (e.g. OSCrypt key churn after reboot), encrypt used to wrap the leftover enc:v1 ciphertext again, permanently poisoning the vault. Startup sync could also push those placeholders to cloud and make download restore the same poison. - Keep real enc:v1 blobs unchanged on encrypt (header check, no wrap) - Strip device-bound placeholders when applying portable sync payloads - Guard startup local-wins / merge round-trips before upload - Skip vault init re-encrypt writes when secrets are still undecrypted Fixes #2702 Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): strip enc:v1 secrets from smart-merge uploads Bugbot found that after local apply sanitized placeholders, legacy v1 smart-merge could still decrypt an unstripped remote, merge it, and re-upload the poison. Strip device-bound credentials on remote decrypt and again on the merged payload before upload. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P2 review on #2702 - Always re-encrypt vault init batches so plaintext siblings are not left unprotected when one record is a stale enc:v1 placeholder - Sanitize device-bound secrets before convergent restore prepare so CRDT replica commit matches vault import - Require a complete safeStorage blob (header + min 31 bytes) before treating enc:v1 as ciphertext; encrypt header-only coincidences Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P1 review on #2702 - Decode enc:v1 payloads with atob in the renderer-safe domain helper - Heal poisoned remote secrets from local/base before smart-merge so good credentials are not discarded as remote-only deletions - Keep post-merge strip so leftover enc:v1 never uploads Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P1 CBC min and startup heal - Accept 19-byte v10/v11 CBC OSCrypt blobs (not only 31-byte GCM) - Heal poisoned remote secrets before startup smart-merge - Strip unresolved placeholders on merge round-trip upload Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): sanitize payloads at every apply/commit boundary Codex P1: vault apply stripped enc:v1 while commitRemoteInspection and convergent materialization could keep the poison. Sanitize merged/remote payloads before apply+base commit, strip on CRDT materialization, and sanitize convergent apply inputs. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): heal local and remote secrets before smart-merge Smart-merge could select a locally-changed entity whose only secret delta was enc:v1 poison, then strip and upload empty secrets. Heal both sides from the opposite payload/base before merge on all sync paths. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): keep enc:v1 intact during convergent materialize Stripping device-bound secrets inside materializeSyncPayloadFromConvergentState broke envelope validation for poisoned-but-consistent v2 snapshots, so decrypt could not hydrate the clouds #2702 needs to recover. Portable stripping stays at apply/upload boundaries. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): detect Windows DPAPI by decoded header bytes Real DPAPI blobs start with 01 00 00 00 d0 8c... and base64-encode as AQAAANCM..., so the previous AQAAAA string prefix rejected them and allowed double-wrapping after key rotation. Match decoded headers in both the main-process bridge and renderer predicate. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): use complete enc:v1 fixtures for stricter detector Short placeholders like enc:v1:djEwAAAA no longer pass the platform header + minimum-size checks. Update auth/SFTP/proxy/sync fixtures to full v10-shaped blobs so npm test matches production validation. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): treat preferred credential deletions as authoritative When healing enc:v1 before merge, an empty/missing secret on a present preferred entity is an intentional clear and must not be revived from base. Only fall back to base when preferred is absent or also poisoned. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): reject impossible v10/v11 ciphertext lengths Accept only CBC-aligned sizes (19+16n) or GCM-sized blobs (>=31) so coincidental enc:v1 plaintext of intermediate length is encrypted instead of treated as an undecryptable placeholder. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): require full DPAPI provider GUID signature Accept Windows safeStorage blobs only when they start with version 01 00 00 00 plus provider GUID df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb, so coincidental 01 00 00 00 prefixes are not treated as ciphertext. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
145 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
145 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript
import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import type { Host, Identity } from "./models";
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import {
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listPasswordPromptFillCandidates,
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resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword,
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} from "./passwordPromptAssist";
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const baseHost = (overrides: Partial<Host> = {}): Host =>
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({
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id: "h1",
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label: "Prod",
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hostname: "prod.example",
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port: 22,
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username: "alice",
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protocol: "ssh",
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...overrides,
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}) as Host;
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const identity = (overrides: Partial<Identity> & Pick<Identity, "id">): Identity =>
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({
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label: overrides.label ?? overrides.id,
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username: overrides.username ?? "user",
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authMethod: overrides.authMethod ?? "password",
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created: overrides.created ?? 1,
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...overrides,
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}) as Identity;
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates includes host password first", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ password: "host-secret" }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [],
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});
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
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assert.deepEqual(
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{
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id: candidates[0].id,
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source: candidates[0].source,
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label: candidates[0].label,
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username: candidates[0].username,
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password: candidates[0].password,
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},
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{
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id: "host",
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source: "host",
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label: "Prod",
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username: "alice",
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password: "host-secret",
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},
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);
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});
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates includes password identities", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ password: "host-secret" }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [
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identity({ id: "i-root", label: "Root", username: "root", password: "root-secret", order: 2 }),
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identity({ id: "i-bob", label: "Bob", username: "bob", password: "bob-secret", order: 1 }),
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],
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});
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 3);
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assert.equal(candidates[0].id, "host");
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assert.equal(candidates[1].id, "identity:i-bob");
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assert.equal(candidates[2].id, "identity:i-root");
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assert.equal(candidates[1].password, "bob-secret");
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});
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates skips key-only identities and placeholders", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ password: "enc:v1:djEwdGVzdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==" }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [
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identity({ id: "key", authMethod: "key", password: undefined }),
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identity({ id: "bad", password: "enc:v1:djEwdGVzdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==" }),
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identity({ id: "ok", password: "ok-secret" }),
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],
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});
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
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assert.equal(candidates[0].id, "identity:ok");
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});
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates respects host savePassword opt-out", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ password: "host-secret", savePassword: false }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [identity({ id: "i1", password: "id-secret" })],
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});
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
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assert.equal(candidates[0].id, "identity:i1");
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});
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates dedupes identical passwords", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ password: "same" }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [identity({ id: "i1", label: "Same as host", password: "same" })],
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});
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
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assert.equal(candidates[0].source, "host");
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});
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates resolves host password from referenced identity", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ password: undefined, identityId: "i1" }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [identity({ id: "i1", username: "alice", password: "via-identity" })],
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});
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// Host resolves via identityId → host candidate; identity also listed but
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// same password is deduped, so only one entry remains (host first).
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
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assert.equal(candidates[0].source, "host");
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assert.equal(candidates[0].password, "via-identity");
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});
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test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates uses the resolved identity username for host row", () => {
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const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
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host: baseHost({ username: "stale-host-user", password: undefined, identityId: "i-root" }),
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keys: [],
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identities: [identity({ id: "i-root", username: "root", password: "root-secret", label: "Root ID" })],
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});
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assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
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assert.equal(candidates[0].source, "host");
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assert.equal(candidates[0].username, "root");
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assert.equal(candidates[0].password, "root-secret");
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});
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test("resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword prefers host", () => {
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assert.equal(
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resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword([
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{ id: "host", source: "host", label: "H", password: "h" },
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{ id: "identity:x", source: "identity", label: "X", password: "x" },
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]),
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"h",
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);
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assert.equal(
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resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword([
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{ id: "identity:x", source: "identity", label: "X", password: "x" },
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]),
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"x",
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);
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assert.equal(resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword([]), undefined);
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});
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