Files
Netcatty/domain/passwordPromptAssist.test.ts
T
904af93a1d fix(credentials): 防止解密失败后二次加密污染本地与云端 (#2702) (#2770)
* fix(credentials): stop double-encrypting undecryptable safeStorage blobs

When local decrypt failed (e.g. OSCrypt key churn after reboot), encrypt
used to wrap the leftover enc:v1 ciphertext again, permanently poisoning
the vault. Startup sync could also push those placeholders to cloud and
make download restore the same poison.

- Keep real enc:v1 blobs unchanged on encrypt (header check, no wrap)
- Strip device-bound placeholders when applying portable sync payloads
- Guard startup local-wins / merge round-trips before upload
- Skip vault init re-encrypt writes when secrets are still undecrypted

Fixes #2702

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): strip enc:v1 secrets from smart-merge uploads

Bugbot found that after local apply sanitized placeholders, legacy v1
smart-merge could still decrypt an unstripped remote, merge it, and
re-upload the poison. Strip device-bound credentials on remote decrypt
and again on the merged payload before upload.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P2 review on #2702

- Always re-encrypt vault init batches so plaintext siblings are not
  left unprotected when one record is a stale enc:v1 placeholder
- Sanitize device-bound secrets before convergent restore prepare so
  CRDT replica commit matches vault import
- Require a complete safeStorage blob (header + min 31 bytes) before
  treating enc:v1 as ciphertext; encrypt header-only coincidences

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P1 review on #2702

- Decode enc:v1 payloads with atob in the renderer-safe domain helper
- Heal poisoned remote secrets from local/base before smart-merge so
  good credentials are not discarded as remote-only deletions
- Keep post-merge strip so leftover enc:v1 never uploads

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P1 CBC min and startup heal

- Accept 19-byte v10/v11 CBC OSCrypt blobs (not only 31-byte GCM)
- Heal poisoned remote secrets before startup smart-merge
- Strip unresolved placeholders on merge round-trip upload

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): sanitize payloads at every apply/commit boundary

Codex P1: vault apply stripped enc:v1 while commitRemoteInspection and
convergent materialization could keep the poison. Sanitize merged/remote
payloads before apply+base commit, strip on CRDT materialization, and
sanitize convergent apply inputs.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): heal local and remote secrets before smart-merge

Smart-merge could select a locally-changed entity whose only secret
delta was enc:v1 poison, then strip and upload empty secrets. Heal
both sides from the opposite payload/base before merge on all sync
paths.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): keep enc:v1 intact during convergent materialize

Stripping device-bound secrets inside materializeSyncPayloadFromConvergentState
broke envelope validation for poisoned-but-consistent v2 snapshots, so decrypt
could not hydrate the clouds #2702 needs to recover. Portable stripping stays
at apply/upload boundaries.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): detect Windows DPAPI by decoded header bytes

Real DPAPI blobs start with 01 00 00 00 d0 8c... and base64-encode as
AQAAANCM..., so the previous AQAAAA string prefix rejected them and
allowed double-wrapping after key rotation. Match decoded headers in
both the main-process bridge and renderer predicate.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(credentials): use complete enc:v1 fixtures for stricter detector

Short placeholders like enc:v1:djEwAAAA no longer pass the platform
header + minimum-size checks. Update auth/SFTP/proxy/sync fixtures to
full v10-shaped blobs so npm test matches production validation.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): treat preferred credential deletions as authoritative

When healing enc:v1 before merge, an empty/missing secret on a present
preferred entity is an intentional clear and must not be revived from
base. Only fall back to base when preferred is absent or also poisoned.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): reject impossible v10/v11 ciphertext lengths

Accept only CBC-aligned sizes (19+16n) or GCM-sized blobs (>=31) so
coincidental enc:v1 plaintext of intermediate length is encrypted instead
of treated as an undecryptable placeholder.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): require full DPAPI provider GUID signature

Accept Windows safeStorage blobs only when they start with version
01 00 00 00 plus provider GUID df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb,
so coincidental 01 00 00 00 prefixes are not treated as ciphertext.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 13:17:24 +08:00

145 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript

import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import type { Host, Identity } from "./models";
import {
listPasswordPromptFillCandidates,
resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword,
} from "./passwordPromptAssist";
const baseHost = (overrides: Partial<Host> = {}): Host =>
({
id: "h1",
label: "Prod",
hostname: "prod.example",
port: 22,
username: "alice",
protocol: "ssh",
...overrides,
}) as Host;
const identity = (overrides: Partial<Identity> & Pick<Identity, "id">): Identity =>
({
label: overrides.label ?? overrides.id,
username: overrides.username ?? "user",
authMethod: overrides.authMethod ?? "password",
created: overrides.created ?? 1,
...overrides,
}) as Identity;
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates includes host password first", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ password: "host-secret" }),
keys: [],
identities: [],
});
assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
assert.deepEqual(
{
id: candidates[0].id,
source: candidates[0].source,
label: candidates[0].label,
username: candidates[0].username,
password: candidates[0].password,
},
{
id: "host",
source: "host",
label: "Prod",
username: "alice",
password: "host-secret",
},
);
});
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates includes password identities", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ password: "host-secret" }),
keys: [],
identities: [
identity({ id: "i-root", label: "Root", username: "root", password: "root-secret", order: 2 }),
identity({ id: "i-bob", label: "Bob", username: "bob", password: "bob-secret", order: 1 }),
],
});
assert.equal(candidates.length, 3);
assert.equal(candidates[0].id, "host");
assert.equal(candidates[1].id, "identity:i-bob");
assert.equal(candidates[2].id, "identity:i-root");
assert.equal(candidates[1].password, "bob-secret");
});
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates skips key-only identities and placeholders", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ password: "enc:v1:djEwdGVzdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==" }),
keys: [],
identities: [
identity({ id: "key", authMethod: "key", password: undefined }),
identity({ id: "bad", password: "enc:v1:djEwdGVzdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==" }),
identity({ id: "ok", password: "ok-secret" }),
],
});
assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
assert.equal(candidates[0].id, "identity:ok");
});
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates respects host savePassword opt-out", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ password: "host-secret", savePassword: false }),
keys: [],
identities: [identity({ id: "i1", password: "id-secret" })],
});
assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
assert.equal(candidates[0].id, "identity:i1");
});
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates dedupes identical passwords", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ password: "same" }),
keys: [],
identities: [identity({ id: "i1", label: "Same as host", password: "same" })],
});
assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
assert.equal(candidates[0].source, "host");
});
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates resolves host password from referenced identity", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ password: undefined, identityId: "i1" }),
keys: [],
identities: [identity({ id: "i1", username: "alice", password: "via-identity" })],
});
// Host resolves via identityId → host candidate; identity also listed but
// same password is deduped, so only one entry remains (host first).
assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
assert.equal(candidates[0].source, "host");
assert.equal(candidates[0].password, "via-identity");
});
test("listPasswordPromptFillCandidates uses the resolved identity username for host row", () => {
const candidates = listPasswordPromptFillCandidates({
host: baseHost({ username: "stale-host-user", password: undefined, identityId: "i-root" }),
keys: [],
identities: [identity({ id: "i-root", username: "root", password: "root-secret", label: "Root ID" })],
});
assert.equal(candidates.length, 1);
assert.equal(candidates[0].source, "host");
assert.equal(candidates[0].username, "root");
assert.equal(candidates[0].password, "root-secret");
});
test("resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword prefers host", () => {
assert.equal(
resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword([
{ id: "host", source: "host", label: "H", password: "h" },
{ id: "identity:x", source: "identity", label: "X", password: "x" },
]),
"h",
);
assert.equal(
resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword([
{ id: "identity:x", source: "identity", label: "X", password: "x" },
]),
"x",
);
assert.equal(resolveDefaultPasswordPromptFillPassword([]), undefined);
});