mirror of
https://github.com/binaricat/Netcatty.git
synced 2026-11-17 13:01:24 +00:00
* refactor: migrate architecture-debt hooks into application/state Move SFTP Wave A stores/hooks and related vault/AI/terminal/systemManager hooks out of components into application/state, update importers, and keep thin deprecated re-exports at the old paths. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(sftp): align local bookmarks store API with global bookmarks Export subscribe/get/set/rehydrate helpers from localSftpBookmarks to match the globalSftpBookmarks external-store pattern. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(electron): reduce baseline memory via spellcheck/GPU/prewarm guards Disable spellcheck on BrowserWindows and the default session, drop spare renderers, gate aggressive GPU switches behind NETCATTY_COMPAT_GPU, and make settings prewarm opt-in via NETCATTY_PREWARM_SETTINGS. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * Isolate notes and customAccent from TerminalLayer hot props Route vault notes through notesStore (shellHistoryStore pattern) and app accent through appearanceChromeStore so note edits and accent-drag ticks no longer rebuild TerminalLayer. Notes/AI slots and Terminal leaves subscribe locally; VaultView and open-note callbacks stay unchanged. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(ui): cut unnecessary AppView/VaultView/settings re-renders Stabilize TopTabs close handler, memo AppHostTreeLayer, exclude accent from settingsVersion, ignore connectionLogs off the logs section, share lastConnected host refs, and keep rename dialog drafts local so chrome domain stays stable. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: package size, dead code, and consolidation cleanup Remove unused direct deps, exclude Vite-bundled renderer packages from electron-builder, delete high-confidence dead code/no-op transfer warm wiring, consolidate cloud provider IDs and KnownHost/SFTP helpers, and land UI/AGENTS quick wins (rAF text batching, notes draft debounce, streaming plain text, tempDirBridge, diagnostics adapter, External MCP setters). Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: stabilize rAF text batching and diagnostics tests Polyfill requestAnimationFrame for Node, flush pending text before steer buffering, bypass rAF while steer is in flight, and stub global localStorage for AI panel diagnostics adapter tests. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: correct import paths after application/state hook migrations Migrated vault/AI/system hooks still used components/-relative imports; point them at repo-root domain/components/types/lib instead. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: address Bugbot/Codex regressions from perf cleanup - Keep blank Enter from closing RenameDraftDialog; only reset rename state after a non-empty submit - Flush note drafts before vault mutations so pending title/body edits are not overwritten - Re-apply appearanceChromeStore accent on appearanceTheme in Terminal, and keep layer themes unaccented Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(notes): flush draft before markdown export paths Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep editor-close hotkey ref fresh during render Assign handleRequestCloseEditorTabRef in render instead of useEffect so Cmd/Ctrl+W never hits the App stub before the effect runs. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep accent in chrome themes without TerminalLayer thrash Restore accent in globalAppearance for chrome/injection consumers. Keep resolveFocusedAppearance identity stable across accent drag via accent ref, while Terminal leaf still re-applies appearanceChromeStore. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep compose chrome accent live and merge note renames Subscribe theme-panel focusedAppearance to appearanceChromeStore so compose-bar chrome updates during color-picker drag even when resolveFocusedAppearance identity stays stable. Tree renames now merge title into the post-flush note instead of replacing from a stale row. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: clear terminal accent when switching back to theme mode Re-resolve appearanceTheme by catalog id before applyCustomAccent so a stale baked custom cursor/selection cannot stick after accentMode returns to theme while TerminalLayer memo ignores accent props. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: register unsaved prompt singleton during render AppView close handlers call promptUnsavedChanges outside the old render-prop. Assign the singleton during render so Cmd/Ctrl+W and tab close never hit the pre-effect null window that auto-cancels. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep vault import hooks UI-free and flush notes on teardown Move ImportOptions into application/state and inject a notifier so useVaultImportHandlers no longer imports components. Notes drafts also flush on pagehide/beforeunload when Electron tears down without React unmount. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: move AI terminal session context builders into domain buildAITerminalSessionInfo and AIPanelContext now live under domain/ so application hooks no longer import TerminalLayerSupport and create a UI → application → UI cycle. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: drop duplicate AIPanelContext type from TerminalLayerSupport The type is re-exported from domain; the local definition conflicted. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep migrated state hooks free of UI-layer imports Move aiChatStreamingSupport into infrastructure/ai and poll list helpers into domain/systemManager so useAIChatStreaming / useSystemManager no longer import from components. Leave thin re-exports at the old paths. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: move remaining migrated-hook deps out of components Host-key verification types/helpers now live in domain/, and SFTP column layout types live in application/state/sftp/columnLayout. Application hooks no longer import those definitions from the UI layer. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: clear lint blockers and flush notes when panels hide Move AI panel diagnostics persistence into application/state so components stop importing localStorageAdapter. Flush note drafts when retained NotesManager mounts become inactive, and silence related lint warnings in theme/host-key helpers. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(notes): publish notesStore sync on vault note updates updateNotes/updateNoteGroups now publishNotesSnapshot immediately so AI/notes consumers do not briefly read a stale catalog after a hide flush. Flush inactive drafts in useLayoutEffect before paint. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
433 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
433 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
import type { SyncPayload } from "./sync";
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const CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX = "enc:v1:";
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/**
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* Base64 pattern: only allows A-Z, a-z, 0-9, +, / and trailing = padding.
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*/
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const BASE64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+=*$/;
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/**
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* Chromium/Electron safeStorage ciphertext carries known platform headers:
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* - macOS/Linux: plaintext bytes start with "v10" or "v11"
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* - Windows (legacy DPAPI blob): leading bytes are 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00
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*
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* Detect headers on *decoded* bytes. A four-byte DPAPI version alone is not
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* enough — real blobs continue with provider GUID
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* {df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb} (base64 `AQAAANCMnd8...`).
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*
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* We require a known header AND a complete-enough decoded blob. v10/v11 CBC
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* blobs are at least header(3) + one AES block(16) = 19 bytes. Header-only
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* base64 such as `enc:v1:djEw` must not be treated as ciphertext.
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*
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* Keep in sync with electron/bridges/credentialBridge.cjs.
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*
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* References:
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* - components/os_crypt/sync/os_crypt_mac.mm (kObfuscationPrefixV10 = "v10")
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* - components/os_crypt/sync/os_crypt_linux.cc (kObfuscationPrefixV10/V11)
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* - components/os_crypt/sync/os_crypt_win.cc (DPAPI legacy path)
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*/
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const V10_HEADER = [0x76, 0x31, 0x30] as const; // "v10"
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const V11_HEADER = [0x76, 0x31, 0x31] as const; // "v11"
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// Version (4) + provider GUID {df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb} (16).
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const DPAPI_BLOB_PREFIX = [
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0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0xd0, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xdf, 0x01, 0x15, 0xd1, 0x11,
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0x8c, 0x7a, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xc2, 0x97, 0xeb,
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] as const;
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/** Minimum decoded sizes for complete Chromium OSCrypt blobs. */
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const MIN_V10_V11_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES = 19; // CBC: header(3) + one AES block(16)
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const MIN_V10_V11_GCM_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES = 31; // header(3) + nonce(12) + tag(16)
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const MIN_DPAPI_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES = DPAPI_BLOB_PREFIX.length + 1;
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/**
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* Renderer-safe base64 decode. Avoids Node `Buffer` which is unavailable
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* in Electron windows with `nodeIntegration: false`.
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*/
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const decodeBase64Bytes = (payload: string): Uint8Array | null => {
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try {
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if (typeof atob === "function") {
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const binary = atob(payload);
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const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length);
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for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i += 1) {
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out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);
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}
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return out;
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}
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} catch {
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// fall through
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}
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// Node / test environments without atob.
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if (typeof Buffer !== "undefined") {
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try {
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return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(payload, "base64"));
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} catch {
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return null;
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}
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}
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return null;
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};
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const startsWithBytes = (
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decoded: Uint8Array,
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prefix: readonly number[],
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): boolean => {
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if (decoded.byteLength < prefix.length) return false;
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return prefix.every((byte, index) => decoded[index] === byte);
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};
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/** CBC is header(3) + 16-byte blocks; GCM is at least header+nonce+tag (31). */
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const isValidV10V11CiphertextLength = (byteLength: number): boolean => {
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if (byteLength >= MIN_V10_V11_GCM_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES) return true;
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return byteLength >= MIN_V10_V11_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES
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&& (byteLength - 3) % 16 === 0;
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};
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export const isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder = (
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value: string | undefined | null,
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): value is string => {
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if (typeof value !== "string" || !value.startsWith(CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX)) {
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return false;
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}
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const payload = value.slice(CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX.length);
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if (!payload || !BASE64_RE.test(payload)) return false;
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const decoded = decodeBase64Bytes(payload);
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if (!decoded) return false;
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if (startsWithBytes(decoded, V10_HEADER) || startsWithBytes(decoded, V11_HEADER)) {
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return isValidV10V11CiphertextLength(decoded.byteLength);
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}
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if (startsWithBytes(decoded, DPAPI_BLOB_PREFIX)) {
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return decoded.byteLength >= MIN_DPAPI_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES;
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}
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return false;
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};
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/**
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* Strip enc:v1: placeholders from a single credential value.
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* Used at the terminal connection boundary to avoid sending encrypted
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* placeholders as actual passwords to SSH/Telnet servers.
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*/
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export const sanitizeCredentialValue = (
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value: string | undefined,
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): string | undefined => {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(value)) return undefined;
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return value;
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};
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/**
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* Scan a sync payload for any fields that still carry device-bound
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* enc:v1: ciphertext. Returns the dotted paths of offending fields.
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* Used as a pre-upload guard to prevent pushing un-decryptable data.
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*/
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export const findSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentialPaths = (
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payload: SyncPayload,
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): string[] => {
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const issues: string[] = [];
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payload.hosts.forEach((host, index) => {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.password)) {
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issues.push(`hosts[${index}].password`);
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.telnetPassword)) {
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issues.push(`hosts[${index}].telnetPassword`);
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.proxyConfig?.password)) {
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issues.push(`hosts[${index}].proxyConfig.password`);
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}
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});
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payload.keys.forEach((key, index) => {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(key.privateKey)) {
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issues.push(`keys[${index}].privateKey`);
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(key.passphrase)) {
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issues.push(`keys[${index}].passphrase`);
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}
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});
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payload.identities?.forEach((identity, index) => {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(identity.password)) {
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issues.push(`identities[${index}].password`);
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}
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});
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payload.proxyProfiles?.forEach((profile, index) => {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(profile.config.password)) {
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issues.push(`proxyProfiles[${index}].config.password`);
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}
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});
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payload.groupConfigs?.forEach((config, index) => {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(config.password)) {
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issues.push(`groupConfigs[${index}].password`);
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(config.telnetPassword)) {
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issues.push(`groupConfigs[${index}].telnetPassword`);
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(config.proxyConfig?.password)) {
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issues.push(`groupConfigs[${index}].proxyConfig.password`);
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}
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});
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return issues;
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};
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/**
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* Clear device-bound enc:v1 placeholders from a portable sync payload.
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*
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* Cloud / backup payloads must carry plaintext secrets (protected by the
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* master key envelope). If a previous bug uploaded undecryptable local
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* ciphertext, stripping placeholders lets download restore a usable vault
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* shell so the user can re-enter credentials instead of looping forever.
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*/
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export const stripSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentials = (
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payload: SyncPayload,
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): SyncPayload => {
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const hosts = payload.hosts.map((host) => {
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const next = { ...host };
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) delete next.password;
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) delete next.telnetPassword;
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if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
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const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
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next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
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}
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return next;
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});
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const keys = payload.keys.map((key) => {
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const next = { ...key };
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.privateKey)) next.privateKey = "";
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.passphrase)) delete next.passphrase;
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return next;
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});
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const identities = payload.identities?.map((identity) => {
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if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(identity.password)) return identity;
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const next = { ...identity };
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delete next.password;
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return next;
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});
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const proxyProfiles = payload.proxyProfiles?.map((profile) => {
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if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(profile.config.password)) return profile;
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const { password: _removed, ...configRest } = profile.config;
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return { ...profile, config: configRest };
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});
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const groupConfigs = payload.groupConfigs?.map((config) => {
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const next = { ...config };
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) delete next.password;
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) delete next.telnetPassword;
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if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
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const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
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next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
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}
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return next;
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});
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return {
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...payload,
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hosts,
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keys,
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identities: identities ?? payload.identities,
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proxyProfiles: proxyProfiles ?? payload.proxyProfiles,
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groupConfigs: groupConfigs ?? payload.groupConfigs,
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};
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};
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const usableCredential = (value: string | undefined): string | undefined => {
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if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) return undefined;
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(value)) return undefined;
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return value;
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};
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/**
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* Resolve a poisoned secret against preferred then fallback.
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*
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* If the preferred *entity* exists, an empty/missing preferred secret is an
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* explicit deletion and must win over fallback/base. Only when preferred is
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* also poisoned (or the preferred entity is absent) may we revive from base.
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*/
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const healPoisonedCredential = (
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preferredEntity: unknown,
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preferredValue: string | undefined,
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fallbackValue: string | undefined,
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): string | undefined => {
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if (preferredEntity) {
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(preferredValue)) {
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return usableCredential(fallbackValue);
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}
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return usableCredential(preferredValue);
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}
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return usableCredential(fallbackValue);
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};
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/**
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* Before three-way merge, replace device-bound enc:v1 secrets on `poisoned`
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* with usable values from `preferred` then `fallback`. Used for both remote
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* and local sides so a poisoned field cannot win the entity-level merge and
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* delete a still-usable secret from the other side / base.
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*
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* Explicit preferred-side deletions (empty/absent secrets on a present entity)
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* are authoritative and are not revived from base.
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*/
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export const healPoisonedSecretsForMerge = (
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poisoned: SyncPayload,
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preferred: SyncPayload,
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fallback: SyncPayload | null | undefined,
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): SyncPayload => {
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const preferredHosts = new Map(preferred.hosts.map((host) => [host.id, host]));
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const fallbackHosts = new Map((fallback?.hosts ?? []).map((host) => [host.id, host]));
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const hosts = poisoned.hosts.map((host) => {
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const preferredHost = preferredHosts.get(host.id);
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const fallbackHost = fallbackHosts.get(host.id);
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const next = { ...host };
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) {
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const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
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preferredHost,
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preferredHost?.password,
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fallbackHost?.password,
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);
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if (healed !== undefined) next.password = healed;
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else delete next.password;
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) {
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const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
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preferredHost,
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preferredHost?.telnetPassword,
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fallbackHost?.telnetPassword,
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);
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if (healed !== undefined) next.telnetPassword = healed;
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else delete next.telnetPassword;
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}
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if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
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const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
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preferredHost,
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preferredHost?.proxyConfig?.password,
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fallbackHost?.proxyConfig?.password,
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);
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if (healed !== undefined) {
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next.proxyConfig = { ...next.proxyConfig, password: healed };
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} else {
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const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
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next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
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}
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}
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return next;
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});
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const preferredKeys = new Map(preferred.keys.map((key) => [key.id, key]));
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const fallbackKeys = new Map((fallback?.keys ?? []).map((key) => [key.id, key]));
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const keys = poisoned.keys.map((key) => {
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const preferredKey = preferredKeys.get(key.id);
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const fallbackKey = fallbackKeys.get(key.id);
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const next = { ...key };
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.privateKey)) {
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next.privateKey = healPoisonedCredential(
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preferredKey,
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preferredKey?.privateKey,
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fallbackKey?.privateKey,
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) ?? "";
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}
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if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.passphrase)) {
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const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
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preferredKey,
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preferredKey?.passphrase,
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fallbackKey?.passphrase,
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);
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if (healed !== undefined) next.passphrase = healed;
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else delete next.passphrase;
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}
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return next;
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});
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const preferredIdentities = new Map((preferred.identities ?? []).map((identity) => [identity.id, identity]));
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const fallbackIdentities = new Map((fallback?.identities ?? []).map((identity) => [identity.id, identity]));
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const identities = poisoned.identities?.map((identity) => {
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if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(identity.password)) return identity;
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const preferredIdentity = preferredIdentities.get(identity.id);
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const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
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preferredIdentity,
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preferredIdentity?.password,
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fallbackIdentities.get(identity.id)?.password,
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);
|
|
if (healed !== undefined) return { ...identity, password: healed };
|
|
const next = { ...identity };
|
|
delete next.password;
|
|
return next;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const preferredProfiles = new Map((preferred.proxyProfiles ?? []).map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
|
|
const fallbackProfiles = new Map((fallback?.proxyProfiles ?? []).map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
|
|
const proxyProfiles = poisoned.proxyProfiles?.map((profile) => {
|
|
if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(profile.config.password)) return profile;
|
|
const preferredProfile = preferredProfiles.get(profile.id);
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
|
|
preferredProfile,
|
|
preferredProfile?.config.password,
|
|
fallbackProfiles.get(profile.id)?.config.password,
|
|
);
|
|
if (healed !== undefined) {
|
|
return { ...profile, config: { ...profile.config, password: healed } };
|
|
}
|
|
const { password: _removed, ...configRest } = profile.config;
|
|
return { ...profile, config: configRest };
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const preferredGroupConfigs = new Map((preferred.groupConfigs ?? []).map((config) => [config.path, config]));
|
|
const fallbackGroupConfigs = new Map((fallback?.groupConfigs ?? []).map((config) => [config.path, config]));
|
|
const groupConfigs = poisoned.groupConfigs?.map((config) => {
|
|
const preferredConfig = preferredGroupConfigs.get(config.path);
|
|
const fallbackConfig = fallbackGroupConfigs.get(config.path);
|
|
const next = { ...config };
|
|
let changed = false;
|
|
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) {
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
|
|
preferredConfig,
|
|
preferredConfig?.password,
|
|
fallbackConfig?.password,
|
|
);
|
|
if (healed !== undefined) next.password = healed;
|
|
else delete next.password;
|
|
changed = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) {
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
|
|
preferredConfig,
|
|
preferredConfig?.telnetPassword,
|
|
fallbackConfig?.telnetPassword,
|
|
);
|
|
if (healed !== undefined) next.telnetPassword = healed;
|
|
else delete next.telnetPassword;
|
|
changed = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
|
|
preferredConfig,
|
|
preferredConfig?.proxyConfig?.password,
|
|
fallbackConfig?.proxyConfig?.password,
|
|
);
|
|
if (healed !== undefined) {
|
|
next.proxyConfig = { ...next.proxyConfig, password: healed };
|
|
} else {
|
|
const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
|
|
next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
|
|
}
|
|
changed = true;
|
|
}
|
|
return changed ? next : config;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
...poisoned,
|
|
hosts,
|
|
keys,
|
|
identities: identities ?? poisoned.identities,
|
|
proxyProfiles: proxyProfiles ?? poisoned.proxyProfiles,
|
|
groupConfigs: groupConfigs ?? poisoned.groupConfigs,
|
|
};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|