mirror of
https://github.com/binaricat/Netcatty.git
synced 2026-11-17 04:50:52 +00:00
* fix(credentials): stop double-encrypting undecryptable safeStorage blobs When local decrypt failed (e.g. OSCrypt key churn after reboot), encrypt used to wrap the leftover enc:v1 ciphertext again, permanently poisoning the vault. Startup sync could also push those placeholders to cloud and make download restore the same poison. - Keep real enc:v1 blobs unchanged on encrypt (header check, no wrap) - Strip device-bound placeholders when applying portable sync payloads - Guard startup local-wins / merge round-trips before upload - Skip vault init re-encrypt writes when secrets are still undecrypted Fixes #2702 Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): strip enc:v1 secrets from smart-merge uploads Bugbot found that after local apply sanitized placeholders, legacy v1 smart-merge could still decrypt an unstripped remote, merge it, and re-upload the poison. Strip device-bound credentials on remote decrypt and again on the merged payload before upload. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P2 review on #2702 - Always re-encrypt vault init batches so plaintext siblings are not left unprotected when one record is a stale enc:v1 placeholder - Sanitize device-bound secrets before convergent restore prepare so CRDT replica commit matches vault import - Require a complete safeStorage blob (header + min 31 bytes) before treating enc:v1 as ciphertext; encrypt header-only coincidences Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P1 review on #2702 - Decode enc:v1 payloads with atob in the renderer-safe domain helper - Heal poisoned remote secrets from local/base before smart-merge so good credentials are not discarded as remote-only deletions - Keep post-merge strip so leftover enc:v1 never uploads Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): address Codex P1 CBC min and startup heal - Accept 19-byte v10/v11 CBC OSCrypt blobs (not only 31-byte GCM) - Heal poisoned remote secrets before startup smart-merge - Strip unresolved placeholders on merge round-trip upload Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): sanitize payloads at every apply/commit boundary Codex P1: vault apply stripped enc:v1 while commitRemoteInspection and convergent materialization could keep the poison. Sanitize merged/remote payloads before apply+base commit, strip on CRDT materialization, and sanitize convergent apply inputs. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): heal local and remote secrets before smart-merge Smart-merge could select a locally-changed entity whose only secret delta was enc:v1 poison, then strip and upload empty secrets. Heal both sides from the opposite payload/base before merge on all sync paths. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): keep enc:v1 intact during convergent materialize Stripping device-bound secrets inside materializeSyncPayloadFromConvergentState broke envelope validation for poisoned-but-consistent v2 snapshots, so decrypt could not hydrate the clouds #2702 needs to recover. Portable stripping stays at apply/upload boundaries. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): detect Windows DPAPI by decoded header bytes Real DPAPI blobs start with 01 00 00 00 d0 8c... and base64-encode as AQAAANCM..., so the previous AQAAAA string prefix rejected them and allowed double-wrapping after key rotation. Match decoded headers in both the main-process bridge and renderer predicate. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * test(credentials): use complete enc:v1 fixtures for stricter detector Short placeholders like enc:v1:djEwAAAA no longer pass the platform header + minimum-size checks. Update auth/SFTP/proxy/sync fixtures to full v10-shaped blobs so npm test matches production validation. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(sync): treat preferred credential deletions as authoritative When healing enc:v1 before merge, an empty/missing secret on a present preferred entity is an intentional clear and must not be revived from base. Only fall back to base when preferred is absent or also poisoned. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): reject impossible v10/v11 ciphertext lengths Accept only CBC-aligned sizes (19+16n) or GCM-sized blobs (>=31) so coincidental enc:v1 plaintext of intermediate length is encrypted instead of treated as an undecryptable placeholder. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): require full DPAPI provider GUID signature Accept Windows safeStorage blobs only when they start with version 01 00 00 00 plus provider GUID df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb, so coincidental 01 00 00 00 prefixes are not treated as ciphertext. Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
159 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
159 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
import test from "node:test";
|
|
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
|
import {
|
|
findSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentialPaths,
|
|
healPoisonedSecretsForMerge,
|
|
isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder,
|
|
stripSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentials,
|
|
} from "./credentials.ts";
|
|
import type { SyncPayload } from "./sync.ts";
|
|
|
|
const completeBlob = Buffer.alloc(19, 0);
|
|
Buffer.from("v10", "utf8").copy(completeBlob, 0);
|
|
const ENC = `enc:v1:${completeBlob.toString("base64")}`;
|
|
|
|
function samplePayload(overrides: Partial<SyncPayload> = {}): SyncPayload {
|
|
return {
|
|
hosts: [
|
|
{
|
|
id: "h1",
|
|
label: "prod",
|
|
hostname: "prod.example",
|
|
username: "root",
|
|
password: ENC,
|
|
port: 22,
|
|
os: "linux",
|
|
group: "",
|
|
tags: [],
|
|
protocol: "ssh",
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
keys: [
|
|
{
|
|
id: "k1",
|
|
label: "key",
|
|
type: "ED25519",
|
|
privateKey: ENC,
|
|
source: "imported",
|
|
category: "key",
|
|
created: 1,
|
|
},
|
|
],
|
|
identities: [],
|
|
snippets: [],
|
|
customGroups: [],
|
|
syncedAt: 1,
|
|
...overrides,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
test("isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder detects complete v10 device-bound ciphertext", () => {
|
|
assert.equal(isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(ENC), true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder rejects intermediate v10 lengths that are neither CBC nor GCM", () => {
|
|
const body = Buffer.alloc(24, 0);
|
|
Buffer.from("v10", "utf8").copy(body, 0);
|
|
assert.equal(isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(`enc:v1:${body.toString("base64")}`), false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder detects real Windows DPAPI base64 prefixes", () => {
|
|
const body = Buffer.from([
|
|
0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0xd0, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xdf, 0x01, 0x15, 0xd1, 0x11,
|
|
0x8c, 0x7a, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xc2, 0x97, 0xeb,
|
|
0xaa,
|
|
]);
|
|
const encoded = body.toString("base64");
|
|
assert.equal(encoded.startsWith("AQAAANCMnd8"), true);
|
|
assert.equal(isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(`enc:v1:${encoded}`), true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder rejects header-only enc:v1 payloads", () => {
|
|
assert.equal(isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder("enc:v1:djEw"), false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("findSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentialPaths reports host and key secrets", () => {
|
|
const paths = findSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentialPaths(samplePayload());
|
|
assert.deepEqual(paths, ["hosts[0].password", "keys[0].privateKey"]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("stripSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentials clears device-bound placeholders for recovery", () => {
|
|
const stripped = stripSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentials(samplePayload());
|
|
assert.equal(stripped.hosts[0]?.password, undefined);
|
|
assert.equal(stripped.keys[0]?.privateKey, "");
|
|
assert.equal(findSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentialPaths(stripped).length, 0);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("healPoisonedSecretsForMerge keeps usable preferred passwords over poisoned enc:v1", () => {
|
|
const poisoned = samplePayload();
|
|
const preferred = samplePayload({
|
|
hosts: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().hosts[0]!,
|
|
password: "preferred-secret",
|
|
}],
|
|
keys: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().keys[0]!,
|
|
privateKey: "PREFERRED_PRIVATE_KEY",
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const fallback = samplePayload({
|
|
hosts: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().hosts[0]!,
|
|
password: "base-secret",
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedSecretsForMerge(poisoned, preferred, fallback);
|
|
assert.equal(healed.hosts[0]?.password, "preferred-secret");
|
|
assert.equal(healed.keys[0]?.privateKey, "PREFERRED_PRIVATE_KEY");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("healPoisonedSecretsForMerge heals local poison from remote then base", () => {
|
|
const local = samplePayload();
|
|
const remote = samplePayload({
|
|
hosts: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().hosts[0]!,
|
|
password: "remote-secret",
|
|
}],
|
|
keys: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().keys[0]!,
|
|
privateKey: ENC,
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const base = samplePayload({
|
|
keys: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().keys[0]!,
|
|
privateKey: "BASE_PRIVATE_KEY",
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedSecretsForMerge(local, remote, base);
|
|
assert.equal(healed.hosts[0]?.password, "remote-secret");
|
|
assert.equal(healed.keys[0]?.privateKey, "BASE_PRIVATE_KEY");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("healPoisonedSecretsForMerge preserves explicit preferred credential deletions", () => {
|
|
const poisoned = samplePayload({
|
|
hosts: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().hosts[0]!,
|
|
label: "renamed-on-poisoned-device",
|
|
password: ENC,
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const preferred = samplePayload({
|
|
hosts: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().hosts[0]!,
|
|
label: "renamed-on-poisoned-device",
|
|
password: undefined,
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const fallback = samplePayload({
|
|
hosts: [{
|
|
...samplePayload().hosts[0]!,
|
|
password: "base-secret",
|
|
}],
|
|
});
|
|
const healed = healPoisonedSecretsForMerge(poisoned, preferred, fallback);
|
|
assert.equal(healed.hosts[0]?.password, undefined);
|
|
assert.equal(healed.hosts[0]?.label, "renamed-on-poisoned-device");
|
|
});
|