Files
Netcatty/domain/credentials.ts
T
cd7f182401 feat(ssh): host TOTP with QR scan and MFA auto-fill (#3323) (#3788)
* feat(ssh): add per-host TOTP with QR scan and MFA auto-fill

Store an optional otpauth TOTP secret on the host, encrypt and sync it
like a password, and auto-submit it once when a keyboard-interactive
prompt matches JumpServer or PAM TOTP text.

Closes #3323
Refs #3415

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): address Codex TOTP review findings

Reset authenticator editor state when the host changes, match custom
prompts with RE2, offer keyboard-interactive during connection tests
when TOTP is configured, and drop the secret when a host becomes a plugin.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): fill TOTP from the active prompt and ship re2js

Attach the connection's otpauth URI to the keyboard-interactive dialog
so Fill current code uses that attempt, including unsaved hosts. Move
re2js into production dependencies so packaged builds can match custom prompts.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): ship the shared TOTP runtime in packaged builds

electron-builder allowlists domain CommonJS modules individually, and
sshAuthHelper requires domain/totp.shared.cjs at load.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): save a pasted TOTP secret and ignore stale QR imports

Host save waits for the authenticator draft to validate before writing
the host. QR import completions from the previous host no longer change
busy state or errors on the newly selected host.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(host): ignore TOTP copy in the proxy command summary check

The assertion was matching the word secret in the authenticator UI.
It now checks that the ProxyCommand token itself is not rendered.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(ssh): simplify host TOTP setup and type codes into the terminal

Move authenticator setup into a dialog so the host form keeps a single setting row, show keyboard-interactive prompts as field labels, and add a terminal context-menu action that types the current code without Enter.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): keep TOTP fill inside the auth dialog

Remove the terminal context-menu action. Offer the verification-code button on each non-password prompt, highlight OTP prompts, and never write the code into the password field.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): keep MFA instructions and scan every screen

Show keyboard-interactive name and instructions as plain text when they are not already the field label, and scan each unmatched desktop source once instead of repeating the first display.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): keep multiline MFA prompt directions

Show lines before the last keyboard-interactive prompt as plain-text guidance, and keep that last line as the field label.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): scan TOTP QR codes at each display's full size

Request a thumbnail as wide as the widest display and as tall as the tallest, so a portrait screen is not scaled into a landscape frame.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ssh): keep TOTP fill off menu prompts

Judge the fill action from the last prompt line and the shared menu, SMS, and confirmation exclusion list. Use a secondary button on the label row, and simplify the host authenticator row.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-20 19:22:05 +08:00

464 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SyncPayload } from "./sync";
const CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX = "enc:v1:";
/**
* Base64 pattern: only allows A-Z, a-z, 0-9, +, / and trailing = padding.
*/
const BASE64_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+=*$/;
/**
* Chromium/Electron safeStorage ciphertext carries known platform headers:
* - macOS/Linux: plaintext bytes start with "v10" or "v11"
* - Windows (legacy DPAPI blob): leading bytes are 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00
*
* Detect headers on *decoded* bytes. A four-byte DPAPI version alone is not
* enough — real blobs continue with provider GUID
* {df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb} (base64 `AQAAANCMnd8...`).
*
* We require a known header AND a complete-enough decoded blob. v10/v11 CBC
* blobs are at least header(3) + one AES block(16) = 19 bytes. Header-only
* base64 such as `enc:v1:djEw` must not be treated as ciphertext.
*
* Keep in sync with electron/bridges/credentialBridge.cjs.
*
* References:
* - components/os_crypt/sync/os_crypt_mac.mm (kObfuscationPrefixV10 = "v10")
* - components/os_crypt/sync/os_crypt_linux.cc (kObfuscationPrefixV10/V11)
* - components/os_crypt/sync/os_crypt_win.cc (DPAPI legacy path)
*/
const V10_HEADER = [0x76, 0x31, 0x30] as const; // "v10"
const V11_HEADER = [0x76, 0x31, 0x31] as const; // "v11"
// Version (4) + provider GUID {df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb} (16).
const DPAPI_BLOB_PREFIX = [
0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0xd0, 0x8c, 0x9d, 0xdf, 0x01, 0x15, 0xd1, 0x11,
0x8c, 0x7a, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x4f, 0xc2, 0x97, 0xeb,
] as const;
/** Minimum decoded sizes for complete Chromium OSCrypt blobs. */
const MIN_V10_V11_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES = 19; // CBC: header(3) + one AES block(16)
const MIN_V10_V11_GCM_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES = 31; // header(3) + nonce(12) + tag(16)
const MIN_DPAPI_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES = DPAPI_BLOB_PREFIX.length + 1;
/**
* Renderer-safe base64 decode. Avoids Node `Buffer` which is unavailable
* in Electron windows with `nodeIntegration: false`.
*/
const decodeBase64Bytes = (payload: string): Uint8Array | null => {
try {
if (typeof atob === "function") {
const binary = atob(payload);
const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length);
for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i += 1) {
out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);
}
return out;
}
} catch {
// fall through
}
// Node / test environments without atob.
if (typeof Buffer !== "undefined") {
try {
return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(payload, "base64"));
} catch {
return null;
}
}
return null;
};
const startsWithBytes = (
decoded: Uint8Array,
prefix: readonly number[],
): boolean => {
if (decoded.byteLength < prefix.length) return false;
return prefix.every((byte, index) => decoded[index] === byte);
};
/** CBC is header(3) + 16-byte blocks; GCM is at least header+nonce+tag (31). */
const isValidV10V11CiphertextLength = (byteLength: number): boolean => {
if (byteLength >= MIN_V10_V11_GCM_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES) return true;
return byteLength >= MIN_V10_V11_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES
&& (byteLength - 3) % 16 === 0;
};
export const isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder = (
value: string | undefined | null,
): value is string => {
if (typeof value !== "string" || !value.startsWith(CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX)) {
return false;
}
const payload = value.slice(CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTION_PREFIX.length);
if (!payload || !BASE64_RE.test(payload)) return false;
const decoded = decodeBase64Bytes(payload);
if (!decoded) return false;
if (startsWithBytes(decoded, V10_HEADER) || startsWithBytes(decoded, V11_HEADER)) {
return isValidV10V11CiphertextLength(decoded.byteLength);
}
if (startsWithBytes(decoded, DPAPI_BLOB_PREFIX)) {
return decoded.byteLength >= MIN_DPAPI_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES;
}
return false;
};
/**
* Strip enc:v1: placeholders from a single credential value.
* Used at the terminal connection boundary to avoid sending encrypted
* placeholders as actual passwords to SSH/Telnet servers.
*/
export const sanitizeCredentialValue = (
value: string | undefined,
): string | undefined => {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(value)) return undefined;
return value;
};
export const isVaultStoredKeySource = (
source: string | undefined,
): source is "imported" | "generated" =>
source === "imported" || source === "generated";
/**
* Imported/generated keys store private material in the vault. Empty or
* still-encrypted privateKey means hydration has not finished (or failed).
*/
export const needsVaultStoredKeyHydration = (
key?: { source?: string; privateKey?: string } | null,
): boolean => {
if (!key || !isVaultStoredKeySource(key.source)) return false;
return !key.privateKey || isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(key.privateKey);
};
/**
* Scan a sync payload for any fields that still carry device-bound
* enc:v1: ciphertext. Returns the dotted paths of offending fields.
* Used as a pre-upload guard to prevent pushing un-decryptable data.
*/
export const findSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentialPaths = (
payload: SyncPayload,
): string[] => {
const issues: string[] = [];
payload.hosts.forEach((host, index) => {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.password)) {
issues.push(`hosts[${index}].password`);
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.telnetPassword)) {
issues.push(`hosts[${index}].telnetPassword`);
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.proxyConfig?.password)) {
issues.push(`hosts[${index}].proxyConfig.password`);
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(host.totp?.uri)) {
issues.push(`hosts[${index}].totp.uri`);
}
});
payload.keys.forEach((key, index) => {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(key.privateKey)) {
issues.push(`keys[${index}].privateKey`);
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(key.passphrase)) {
issues.push(`keys[${index}].passphrase`);
}
});
payload.identities?.forEach((identity, index) => {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(identity.password)) {
issues.push(`identities[${index}].password`);
}
});
payload.proxyProfiles?.forEach((profile, index) => {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(profile.config.password)) {
issues.push(`proxyProfiles[${index}].config.password`);
}
});
payload.groupConfigs?.forEach((config, index) => {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(config.password)) {
issues.push(`groupConfigs[${index}].password`);
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(config.telnetPassword)) {
issues.push(`groupConfigs[${index}].telnetPassword`);
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(config.proxyConfig?.password)) {
issues.push(`groupConfigs[${index}].proxyConfig.password`);
}
});
return issues;
};
/**
* Clear device-bound enc:v1 placeholders from a portable sync payload.
*
* Cloud / backup payloads must carry plaintext secrets (protected by the
* master key envelope). If a previous bug uploaded undecryptable local
* ciphertext, stripping placeholders lets download restore a usable vault
* shell so the user can re-enter credentials instead of looping forever.
*/
export const stripSyncPayloadEncryptedCredentials = (
payload: SyncPayload,
): SyncPayload => {
const hosts = payload.hosts.map((host) => {
const next = { ...host };
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) delete next.password;
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) delete next.telnetPassword;
if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
}
if (next.totp && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.totp.uri)) {
delete next.totp;
}
return next;
});
const keys = payload.keys.map((key) => {
const next = { ...key };
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.privateKey)) next.privateKey = "";
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.passphrase)) delete next.passphrase;
return next;
});
const identities = payload.identities?.map((identity) => {
if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(identity.password)) return identity;
const next = { ...identity };
delete next.password;
return next;
});
const proxyProfiles = payload.proxyProfiles?.map((profile) => {
if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(profile.config.password)) return profile;
const { password: _removed, ...configRest } = profile.config;
return { ...profile, config: configRest };
});
const groupConfigs = payload.groupConfigs?.map((config) => {
const next = { ...config };
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) delete next.password;
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) delete next.telnetPassword;
if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
}
return next;
});
return {
...payload,
hosts,
keys,
identities: identities ?? payload.identities,
proxyProfiles: proxyProfiles ?? payload.proxyProfiles,
groupConfigs: groupConfigs ?? payload.groupConfigs,
};
};
const usableCredential = (value: string | undefined): string | undefined => {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) return undefined;
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(value)) return undefined;
return value;
};
/**
* Resolve a poisoned secret against preferred then fallback.
*
* If the preferred *entity* exists, an empty/missing preferred secret is an
* explicit deletion and must win over fallback/base. Only when preferred is
* also poisoned (or the preferred entity is absent) may we revive from base.
*/
const healPoisonedCredential = (
preferredEntity: unknown,
preferredValue: string | undefined,
fallbackValue: string | undefined,
): string | undefined => {
if (preferredEntity) {
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(preferredValue)) {
return usableCredential(fallbackValue);
}
return usableCredential(preferredValue);
}
return usableCredential(fallbackValue);
};
/**
* Before three-way merge, replace device-bound enc:v1 secrets on `poisoned`
* with usable values from `preferred` then `fallback`. Used for both remote
* and local sides so a poisoned field cannot win the entity-level merge and
* delete a still-usable secret from the other side / base.
*
* Explicit preferred-side deletions (empty/absent secrets on a present entity)
* are authoritative and are not revived from base.
*/
export const healPoisonedSecretsForMerge = (
poisoned: SyncPayload,
preferred: SyncPayload,
fallback: SyncPayload | null | undefined,
): SyncPayload => {
const preferredHosts = new Map(preferred.hosts.map((host) => [host.id, host]));
const fallbackHosts = new Map((fallback?.hosts ?? []).map((host) => [host.id, host]));
const hosts = poisoned.hosts.map((host) => {
const preferredHost = preferredHosts.get(host.id);
const fallbackHost = fallbackHosts.get(host.id);
const next = { ...host };
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredHost,
preferredHost?.password,
fallbackHost?.password,
);
if (healed !== undefined) next.password = healed;
else delete next.password;
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredHost,
preferredHost?.telnetPassword,
fallbackHost?.telnetPassword,
);
if (healed !== undefined) next.telnetPassword = healed;
else delete next.telnetPassword;
}
if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredHost,
preferredHost?.proxyConfig?.password,
fallbackHost?.proxyConfig?.password,
);
if (healed !== undefined) {
next.proxyConfig = { ...next.proxyConfig, password: healed };
} else {
const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
}
}
if (next.totp && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.totp.uri)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredHost,
preferredHost?.totp?.uri,
fallbackHost?.totp?.uri,
);
if (healed !== undefined) next.totp = { ...next.totp, uri: healed };
else delete next.totp;
}
return next;
});
const preferredKeys = new Map(preferred.keys.map((key) => [key.id, key]));
const fallbackKeys = new Map((fallback?.keys ?? []).map((key) => [key.id, key]));
const keys = poisoned.keys.map((key) => {
const preferredKey = preferredKeys.get(key.id);
const fallbackKey = fallbackKeys.get(key.id);
const next = { ...key };
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.privateKey)) {
next.privateKey = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredKey,
preferredKey?.privateKey,
fallbackKey?.privateKey,
) ?? "";
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.passphrase)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredKey,
preferredKey?.passphrase,
fallbackKey?.passphrase,
);
if (healed !== undefined) next.passphrase = healed;
else delete next.passphrase;
}
return next;
});
const preferredIdentities = new Map((preferred.identities ?? []).map((identity) => [identity.id, identity]));
const fallbackIdentities = new Map((fallback?.identities ?? []).map((identity) => [identity.id, identity]));
const identities = poisoned.identities?.map((identity) => {
if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(identity.password)) return identity;
const preferredIdentity = preferredIdentities.get(identity.id);
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredIdentity,
preferredIdentity?.password,
fallbackIdentities.get(identity.id)?.password,
);
if (healed !== undefined) return { ...identity, password: healed };
const next = { ...identity };
delete next.password;
return next;
});
const preferredProfiles = new Map((preferred.proxyProfiles ?? []).map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
const fallbackProfiles = new Map((fallback?.proxyProfiles ?? []).map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
const proxyProfiles = poisoned.proxyProfiles?.map((profile) => {
if (!isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(profile.config.password)) return profile;
const preferredProfile = preferredProfiles.get(profile.id);
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredProfile,
preferredProfile?.config.password,
fallbackProfiles.get(profile.id)?.config.password,
);
if (healed !== undefined) {
return { ...profile, config: { ...profile.config, password: healed } };
}
const { password: _removed, ...configRest } = profile.config;
return { ...profile, config: configRest };
});
const preferredGroupConfigs = new Map((preferred.groupConfigs ?? []).map((config) => [config.path, config]));
const fallbackGroupConfigs = new Map((fallback?.groupConfigs ?? []).map((config) => [config.path, config]));
const groupConfigs = poisoned.groupConfigs?.map((config) => {
const preferredConfig = preferredGroupConfigs.get(config.path);
const fallbackConfig = fallbackGroupConfigs.get(config.path);
const next = { ...config };
let changed = false;
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.password)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredConfig,
preferredConfig?.password,
fallbackConfig?.password,
);
if (healed !== undefined) next.password = healed;
else delete next.password;
changed = true;
}
if (isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.telnetPassword)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredConfig,
preferredConfig?.telnetPassword,
fallbackConfig?.telnetPassword,
);
if (healed !== undefined) next.telnetPassword = healed;
else delete next.telnetPassword;
changed = true;
}
if (next.proxyConfig && isEncryptedCredentialPlaceholder(next.proxyConfig.password)) {
const healed = healPoisonedCredential(
preferredConfig,
preferredConfig?.proxyConfig?.password,
fallbackConfig?.proxyConfig?.password,
);
if (healed !== undefined) {
next.proxyConfig = { ...next.proxyConfig, password: healed };
} else {
const { password: _removed, ...proxyRest } = next.proxyConfig;
next.proxyConfig = proxyRest;
}
changed = true;
}
return changed ? next : config;
});
return {
...poisoned,
hosts,
keys,
identities: identities ?? poisoned.identities,
proxyProfiles: proxyProfiles ?? poisoned.proxyProfiles,
groupConfigs: groupConfigs ?? poisoned.groupConfigs,
};
};