Files
Netcatty/domain/pluginConnection.test.ts
T
904af93a1d fix(credentials): 防止解密失败后二次加密污染本地与云端 (#2702) (#2770)
* fix(credentials): stop double-encrypting undecryptable safeStorage blobs

When local decrypt failed (e.g. OSCrypt key churn after reboot), encrypt
used to wrap the leftover enc:v1 ciphertext again, permanently poisoning
the vault. Startup sync could also push those placeholders to cloud and
make download restore the same poison.

- Keep real enc:v1 blobs unchanged on encrypt (header check, no wrap)
- Strip device-bound placeholders when applying portable sync payloads
- Guard startup local-wins / merge round-trips before upload
- Skip vault init re-encrypt writes when secrets are still undecrypted

Fixes #2702

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): strip enc:v1 secrets from smart-merge uploads

Bugbot found that after local apply sanitized placeholders, legacy v1
smart-merge could still decrypt an unstripped remote, merge it, and
re-upload the poison. Strip device-bound credentials on remote decrypt
and again on the merged payload before upload.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P2 review on #2702

- Always re-encrypt vault init batches so plaintext siblings are not
  left unprotected when one record is a stale enc:v1 placeholder
- Sanitize device-bound secrets before convergent restore prepare so
  CRDT replica commit matches vault import
- Require a complete safeStorage blob (header + min 31 bytes) before
  treating enc:v1 as ciphertext; encrypt header-only coincidences

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P1 review on #2702

- Decode enc:v1 payloads with atob in the renderer-safe domain helper
- Heal poisoned remote secrets from local/base before smart-merge so
  good credentials are not discarded as remote-only deletions
- Keep post-merge strip so leftover enc:v1 never uploads

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P1 CBC min and startup heal

- Accept 19-byte v10/v11 CBC OSCrypt blobs (not only 31-byte GCM)
- Heal poisoned remote secrets before startup smart-merge
- Strip unresolved placeholders on merge round-trip upload

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): sanitize payloads at every apply/commit boundary

Codex P1: vault apply stripped enc:v1 while commitRemoteInspection and
convergent materialization could keep the poison. Sanitize merged/remote
payloads before apply+base commit, strip on CRDT materialization, and
sanitize convergent apply inputs.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): heal local and remote secrets before smart-merge

Smart-merge could select a locally-changed entity whose only secret
delta was enc:v1 poison, then strip and upload empty secrets. Heal
both sides from the opposite payload/base before merge on all sync
paths.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): keep enc:v1 intact during convergent materialize

Stripping device-bound secrets inside materializeSyncPayloadFromConvergentState
broke envelope validation for poisoned-but-consistent v2 snapshots, so decrypt
could not hydrate the clouds #2702 needs to recover. Portable stripping stays
at apply/upload boundaries.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): detect Windows DPAPI by decoded header bytes

Real DPAPI blobs start with 01 00 00 00 d0 8c... and base64-encode as
AQAAANCM..., so the previous AQAAAA string prefix rejected them and
allowed double-wrapping after key rotation. Match decoded headers in
both the main-process bridge and renderer predicate.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(credentials): use complete enc:v1 fixtures for stricter detector

Short placeholders like enc:v1:djEwAAAA no longer pass the platform
header + minimum-size checks. Update auth/SFTP/proxy/sync fixtures to
full v10-shaped blobs so npm test matches production validation.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): treat preferred credential deletions as authoritative

When healing enc:v1 before merge, an empty/missing secret on a present
preferred entity is an intentional clear and must not be revived from
base. Only fall back to base when preferred is absent or also poisoned.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): reject impossible v10/v11 ciphertext lengths

Accept only CBC-aligned sizes (19+16n) or GCM-sized blobs (>=31) so
coincidental enc:v1 plaintext of intermediate length is encrypted instead
of treated as an undecryptable placeholder.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): require full DPAPI provider GUID signature

Accept Windows safeStorage blobs only when they start with version
01 00 00 00 plus provider GUID df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb,
so coincidental 01 00 00 00 prefixes are not treated as ciphertext.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 13:17:24 +08:00

71 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript

import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import test from 'node:test';
import {
isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable,
isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl,
pluginProtocolForProvider,
sanitizePluginConnection,
} from './pluginConnection.ts';
test('plugin connection profiles preserve opaque configuration when their provider is absent', () => {
const providerId = 'com.example.transport.connection';
const configuration = { endpoint: 'example', nested: { mode: 'safe' }, ports: [22, 443] };
const result = sanitizePluginConnection({
providerId,
configuration,
authenticationProviderId: 'com.example.transport.authentication',
credentialId: 'credential-reference-1234',
}, pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId));
assert.deepEqual(result, {
providerId,
configuration,
authenticationProviderId: 'com.example.transport.authentication',
credentialId: 'credential-reference-1234',
});
assert.notEqual(result?.configuration, configuration);
});
test('plugin connection profiles fail closed on protocol ownership mismatches and unsafe JSON', () => {
const providerId = 'com.example.transport.connection';
assert.equal(sanitizePluginConnection({ providerId, configuration: {} }, 'plugin:other.plugin.connection'), undefined);
assert.equal(sanitizePluginConnection({ providerId, configuration: { value: Number.NaN } }, pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId)), undefined);
assert.equal(sanitizePluginConnection({ providerId, configuration: { constructor: 'spoof' } }, pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId)), undefined);
});
test('plugin connection profiles preserve explicit null configuration', () => {
const providerId = 'com.example.transport.connection';
assert.deepEqual(
sanitizePluginConnection(
{ providerId, configuration: null },
pluginProtocolForProvider(providerId),
),
{ providerId, configuration: null },
);
});
test('plugin credentials are selectable only after secure catalog publication', () => {
const credentialId = 'credential-reference-0001';
const published = new Set([credentialId]);
assert.equal(isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'secret', published), true);
assert.equal(isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'secret', new Set()), false);
assert.equal(
isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'enc:v1:djEwdGVzdAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==', published),
false,
);
assert.equal(
isPluginCredentialCatalogEntryAvailable(credentialId, 'x'.repeat((64 * 1024) + 1), published),
false,
);
});
test('plugin authentication URLs require HTTPS except for loopback HTTP callbacks', () => {
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('https://login.example.com/authorize'), true);
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://localhost:44123/callback'), true);
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://127.0.0.1:44123/callback'), true);
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://[::1]:44123/callback'), true);
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('http://login.example.com/authorize'), false);
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('https://user:password@login.example.com/authorize'), false);
assert.equal(isSafePluginAuthenticationUrl('javascript:alert(1)'), false);
});