Files
Netcatty/domain/terminalPromptSecurity.shared.cjs
T
260b06540f fix(terminal): keep broadcast on during bash PS2 heredoc paste (#3798)
* fix(terminal): treat bare bash PS2 as a confirmed shell prompt

Broadcast input latched on the default ">" continuation prompt, so the
final Enter of a heredoc paste reached only the focused session.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(terminal): trust bare PS2 only inside a heredoc

A global bare ">" confirmation cleared the sensitive-input latch for
echo-disabled prompts such as read -s -p '> '. Trust that line only when
the preceding command is a confirmed shell prompt containing <<.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(terminal): coalesce a CRLF split across prompt-security chunks

A chunk that ends in CR completes the heredoc opener. The next chunk's
leading LF is the rest of that break, so dropping it keeps the opener
and a following bare PS2 stays trusted.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-20 19:20:19 +08:00

174 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
"use strict";
const ESCAPE_SEQUENCE = "\\x" + "1b";
const BELL_SEQUENCE = "\\x" + "07";
const ANSI_CONTROL_PATTERN = new RegExp(`${ESCAPE_SEQUENCE}\\[[0-?]*[ -/]*[@-~]`, "gu");
const OSC_CONTROL_PATTERN = new RegExp(
`${ESCAPE_SEQUENCE}\\][^${BELL_SEQUENCE}]*(?:${BELL_SEQUENCE}|${ESCAPE_SEQUENCE}\\\\)`,
"gu",
);
const MAX_PROMPT_SECURITY_TAIL_CHARS = 2_048;
const SENSITIVE_ENGLISH_LABEL = [
String.raw`pass(?:word|phrase|code)`,
String.raw`one[\s-]?time(?:\s+(?:password|passcode|code|token))?`,
String.raw`\botp\b`,
String.raw`verification(?:\s+(?:code|token|passcode))?`,
String.raw`authentication\s+(?:code|token|passcode)`,
String.raw`security\s+(?:code|token|passcode|pin)`,
String.raw`\bpin\b`,
String.raw`\btoken\b`,
String.raw`2fa`,
String.raw`two[\s-]?factor`,
String.raw`multi[\s-]?factor`,
String.raw`\bmfa\b`,
String.raw`second\s+factor`,
String.raw`secondary(?:\s+\w+){0,3}\s+passw(?:ord)?`,
String.raw`second(?:\s+\w+){0,3}\s+passw(?:ord)?`,
String.raw`additional(?:\s+\w+){0,3}\s+passw(?:ord)?`,
String.raw`re[-\s]?enter\s+passw(?:ord)?`,
String.raw`confirm\s+passw(?:ord)?`,
String.raw`\bedr\b`,
String.raw`\bduo\b`,
].join("|");
const SENSITIVE_CJK_LABEL = [
"密码", "口令", "动态", "一次性", "验证码", "验证信息", "令牌", "双因素", "多因素",
"短信验证", "手机验证", "二次", "安全密码", "挑战码",
].join("|");
const SENSITIVE_LABEL_PATTERN = new RegExp(
`(?:${SENSITIVE_ENGLISH_LABEL}|${SENSITIVE_CJK_LABEL})`,
"iu",
);
function stripTerminalControlSequences(value) {
return String(value || "").replace(OSC_CONTROL_PATTERN, "").replace(ANSI_CONTROL_PATTERN, "");
}
function lastLogicalLine(value) {
const plain = stripTerminalControlSequences(value);
const boundary = Math.max(plain.lastIndexOf("\n"), plain.lastIndexOf("\r"));
return plain.slice(boundary + 1).slice(-MAX_PROMPT_SECURITY_TAIL_CHARS);
}
function isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(value) {
const line = lastLogicalLine(value).trim();
if (!line) return false;
const label = SENSITIVE_LABEL_PATTERN.exec(line);
if (!label) return false;
const prefix = line.slice(0, label.index || 0).trim();
const suffix = line.slice((label.index || 0) + label[0].length);
if (suffix.trim().length === 0) {
return prefix.length === 0
|| /(?:^|\s)(?:enter|input|provide|type|scan|please|your|current|new|old)\s*$/iu.test(prefix)
|| /(?:输入|请输入|请)\s*$/u.test(prefix);
}
if (/^\s+(?:for|of)\s+[^\r\n]{1,96}$/iu.test(suffix)) return true;
return /^[^\r\n::>›»]{0,96}[::>›»]\s*[^\r\n]{0,1024}$/u.test(suffix);
}
function isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(promptText, options = {}) {
const prompt = lastLogicalLine(promptText).trim();
if (!prompt || isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(prompt)) return false;
if (/[❯❮→➜➤⟩»›]/u.test(prompt)) return true;
for (const character of prompt) {
const code = character.charCodeAt(0);
if (code >= 0xE000 && code <= 0xF8FF) return true;
}
if (/[$#%]$/u.test(prompt)) return true;
// POSIX sh/bash/ksh default PS2. Trusted only with heredoc context (#3796).
if (prompt === ">") return isHeredocPs2Continuation(promptText, options);
if (!prompt.endsWith(">")) return false;
if (/^(?:PS\s+)?[A-Za-z]:[\\/].*>$/u.test(prompt)) return true;
if (/[@\\/~:]\S*>$/u.test(prompt)) return true;
return options.allowHostStyleGreaterThan === true
&& /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+(?:\([^)]{1,128}\))?>$/u.test(prompt);
}
function splitTerminalLogicalLines(value) {
const lines = [];
let start = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i += 1) {
const ch = value[i];
if (ch !== "\n" && ch !== "\r") continue;
lines.push(value.slice(start, i));
if (ch === "\r" && value[i + 1] === "\n") i += 1;
start = i + 1;
}
lines.push(value.slice(start));
return lines;
}
function isBashPs2ContinuationLine(line) {
const trimmed = line.trim();
return trimmed === ">" || trimmed.startsWith("> ");
}
function commandAfterConfirmedShellPrompt(line, options) {
const text = line.trim();
for (let i = 0; i < text.length - 1; i += 1) {
const ch = text[i];
if (ch !== "$" && ch !== "#" && ch !== "%" && ch !== ">") continue;
const rest = text.slice(i + 1);
if (!/^\s+\S/u.test(rest)) continue;
const candidate = text.slice(0, i + 1);
if (!isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(candidate, options)) continue;
if ((ch === "$" || ch === "#" || ch === "%") && !isPlausibleShellPromptBody(candidate.slice(0, -1))) {
continue;
}
return rest;
}
return null;
}
// Bare ">" is bash PS2 only inside a heredoc opened by a confirmed shell
// command (#3796). read -s -p '> ' and other origins stay fail-closed.
function isHeredocPs2Continuation(value, options) {
const lines = splitTerminalLogicalLines(stripTerminalControlSequences(value));
let index = lines.length - 2;
while (index >= 0 && isBashPs2ContinuationLine(lines[index])) index -= 1;
if (index < 0) return false;
const command = commandAfterConfirmedShellPrompt(lines[index], options);
return command != null && command.includes("<<");
}
function isPlausibleShellPromptBody(body) {
const trimmed = body.trim();
if (!trimmed) return true;
if (/@|[/\\~:]/u.test(trimmed)) return true;
if (/^(?:bash|zsh|sh|fish|ksh|csh|tcsh|dash)(?:-[\d.]+)?$/iu.test(trimmed)) return true;
return /^[a-z0-9_.-]+$/u.test(trimmed);
}
function hasTypedInputAfterConfirmedPrompt(line, options = {}) {
for (let i = 0; i < line.length - 1; i += 1) {
const ch = line[i];
if (ch !== "$" && ch !== "#" && ch !== "%" && ch !== ">") continue;
const rest = line.slice(i + 1);
if (!/^\s+\S/u.test(rest)) continue;
const candidate = line.slice(0, i + 1);
if (!isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(candidate, options)) continue;
if ((ch === "$" || ch === "#" || ch === "%") && !isPlausibleShellPromptBody(candidate.slice(0, -1))) {
continue;
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
function isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt(value, options = {}) {
const prompt = lastLogicalLine(value).trim();
if (!prompt) return false;
if (isSensitiveTerminalChallenge(prompt)) return true;
// Vim command-mode entry on the alternate screen. A bare `:` on the
// primary screen stays fail-closed (`sudo -p ':'`).
if (options.alternateScreen && /^:\s*$/.test(prompt)) return false;
if (!/[::>›»]\s*$/u.test(prompt)) return false;
if (hasTypedInputAfterConfirmedPrompt(prompt, options)) return false;
// Pass the original text so a bare ">" can see heredoc lines above it.
return !isConfirmedTerminalShellPrompt(value, options);
}
module.exports = { isUntrustedTerminalInputPrompt };